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INTRODUCTION
Privatization is all the rage. Over the last generation, pri-
vate enterprise greatly increased its involvement in many ac-
tivities that had been largely reserved to government., Has
privatization extended to the creation of law? Is this core func-
tion of government now being performed privately? This Arti-
cle will consider the extent to which the creation of law has
been privatized through arbitration. It will suggest that, un-
der Supreme Court cases and other current legal doctrine, vast
areas of law are privatizable and that this degree of privatiza-
tion is possible only through arbitration. The implications of
this conclusion are far-reaching, both for legal doctrine and for
legal theory.
The Article begins by defining terms, particularly what it
means to "privatize" law. Part H explains how current arbitra-
tion law permits parties to privatize other areas of law. The
implications of this point are explored in Part III and are sepa-
rated along the familiar line between mandatory rules of law
and default rules. The first implication is that arbitrationjeopardizes mandatory rules of law. To preserve the manda-
tory effect of these rules, the Supreme Court must make a
choice. The Court must either reverse its decisions that claims
arising under otherwise mandatory rules are arbitrable, or re-
quire de novo judicial review of arbitrators' legal rulings on
such claims. The second implication is that claims arising un-
der default rules should be arbitrable and completely free fromjudicial review for errors of law. The arbitration of claims
arising under default rules presents an opportunity to privat-
ize the creation of vast areas of law. It is an opportunity to
create private legal systems of unwritten norms,2 written rules,
and the precedents of private courts.
1. See DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING
HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE THAT
IS REMAKING THE MODERN WORLD 12-13 (1998).
2. On the use of the word "norm," see Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997).
[Nionlegal obligations may be created and enforced in a centralized or
decentralized manner. Centralized private organizations, such as a
diamond bourse, enforce relatively formal, usually written, rules,
while groups and entire societies often enforce highly informal rules,
such as the property norms ranchers follow in Shasta County. The
distinction is important because some theorists prefer to use the term
norms to refer only to decentralized rules and regard organizational
rules as a set of obligations falling between centralized law and de-
centralized norms.
704 [Vol. 83:703
PRIVATIZING LAW
I. PRIVATIZING LAW
"Private law" can mean different things in different con-
texts. Used broadly, it can mean all law respecting the rights
of private parties against each other, even though such law is
created and enforced by government.3 Used narrowly, "private
law" can mean only law created and enforced without any gov-
ernment involvement whatsoever.4 In this Article, I use
"private law" to mean privately-created law that is enforced by
government. The most familiar example of private law in this
sense is a contract between private parties.5 A contract term is
privately-created law that is enforced by government. The en-
forcement of contracts privatizes the creation of law. When
contracts are enforced, privately-created rights and duties re-
place whatever government-created rights and duties would
otherwise apply.
Not all contract terms are enforced by government. Many
government-created rights and duties apply despite private
agreements to substitute alternative rights and duties. For
example, a manufacturer of consumer products remains under
a duty to sell goods not "in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user"6 even if the user has agreed to accept
such goods.7 This law, requiring safe consumer goods, cannot
be privatized.
Id. at 351 (citations omitted).
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1196 (6th ed. 1990) (defining private law as
"all that part of the law which is administered between citizen and citizen, or
which is concerned with the definition, regulation, and enforcement of rights
in cases where both the person in whom the right inheres and the person
upon whom the obligation is incident are private individuals").
4. Some might object that "law," under any coherent definition, presup-
poses government, an organized monopoly of coercive force. See, e.g., Hans
Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARV. L.
REV. 44, 58, 65 (1941). See generally ERVIN H. POLLAcK, JURISPRUDENCE:
PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS 521-633 (1979) (discussing legal positivism).
Others make strong arguments that law, in a meaningful sense, can exist
without government. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF
LIBERTY 284-97 (1998) (describing imaginary polycentric legal order); BRUCE
L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW: JUSTICE WITHOUT THE STATE (1990)
(describing and envisioning law without government). See generally Tom W.
Bell, Polycentric Law, 7 HUMANE STUD. REV. 1 (Winter 1991/92).
5. Other examples of private law include deeds, wills and trusts, and
commercial devices, such as negotiable instruments and letters of credit. An-
other example is the doctrine of consent in tort. See discussion infra note 26.
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
7. See id. cmt. m ("The consumer's cause of action.., is not affected by
any disclaimer or other agreement."); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
1999] 705
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This distinction is often known as the distinction between
default rules and mandatory (or immutable) rules.8 Default
rules are those government-created rights and duties that are
privatizable, rules that govern unless the parties contract out
of them.9 Mandatory rules are those government-created
rights and duties that cannot be avoided by contract, those that
are not privatizable. 10 So defined, enormous quantities of state
KEETON ON TORTS § 97, at 691-92 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988). This opposi-
tion to contract enforcement continues in the proposed revision to the Re-
statement of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LI-
ABILITY § 18 (1998).
8. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Con-
tracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989);
Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Con-
sent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 825 (1992). Another way to phrase the distinction is
that between alienable and inalienable rights. Default rules confer alienable
rights, while mandatory rules confer inalienable rights. See Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Insider Trading Under the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers, 19 J. CORP. L. 1, 36-37 (1993) ("Default rules in corporate law are
analogous to alienable property rights.... Continuing the analogy, mandatory
rules in corporate law are comparable to inalienable property rights."); G.
Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 431,
444 (1993) ("[Rlights that are governed by an immutable rule are 'market-
inalienable' because they cannot be traded as part of a contractual exchange.
Rights governed by default rules are 'alienable' because parties may alter the
rules as part of a market transaction."). Even rights conferred by mandatory
rules, however, become alienable once a dispute has arisen. See discussion
infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer, Services Contracts: The Forgotten Sec-
tor of Commercial Law, 26 LOY. L.. L. REV. 725, 733 (1993) ("'[D]efault
rules ... govern in the absence of contract terms to the contrary."); W. David
Slawson, The Futile Search for Principles for Default Rules, 3 S. CAL. IN-
TERDISC. L.J. 29, 29 (1994) ("The contract preempts a law that would other-
wise have determined the rights or duties of the parties."). One can distin-
guish among default rules by the process parties must use to opt out of them.
Some default rules require more elaborate processes than others. See, e.g.,
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 8, passim (contrasting penalty, tailored and un-
tailored default rules); Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration As Exceptional
Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29
MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 219 (1998) (contrasting contractual and "knowing and
voluntary" standards).
10. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 8, at 88 ("Immutable rules displace
freedom of contract."). One can distinguish mandatory rules that are part of
contract law from those that are not. Mandatory rules of non-contract law
apply whether or not a contract is formed; mandatory rules of contract law
apply only if a contract is formed. See Stewart Schwab, A Coasean Experi-
ment on Contract Presumptions, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 239 n.6 (1988)(referring to mandatory rules of contract law "as coercive contract rules"); see
also Ayres & Gertner, supra note 8, at 87 n.1 ("[Ilmmutable entitlements are
created by and conditioned upon contract, while inalienable entitlements exist
outside of contract."). But see Lawrence Kalevitch, Gaps in Contracts: A Cri-
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and federal law are not privatizable. These vast bodies of law
consist of mandatory rules.l" That, at least, is the prevailing
view.
In this Article, I advocate an alternative view. I contend
that much of what is widely-believed to be mandatory is, under
Supreme Court cases and other current legal doctrine, effec-
tively default. I argue that vast areas of law are, contrary to
the received wisdom, privatizable. Parties can contract out of
this law, but only by using a particular sort of contract, an ar-
bitration agreement.
H. PRIVATIZING LAW THROUGH ARBITRATION
A. OVERVIEW OF ARBITRATION
Arbitration, like litigation, is a form of adjudication. 12 The
difference between the two is that arbitration is private adjudi-
tique of Consent Theory, 54 MONT. L. REV. 169, 170 n.1 (1993) ("[Inumutable
rules of contract law are oxymoronic and paradoxical.").
I suggest a further distinction within mandatory rules of contract law.
The mandatory rules specifying the requirements for forming an enforceable
contract differ from other mandatory rules of contract law in that the former
must, as a matter of logic, be mandatory. See discussion infra notes 197-99
and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Ware, supra note 9, at 207-09. Examples include the tort
law of strict products liability, the warranty of habitability in landlord/tenant
law, usury laws, and laws prescribing terms of insurance and employment
contracts. See id.
12. "Arbitration is a form of adjudication because the parties participate
in the decisional process by presenting evidence and reasoned arguments to
an arbitrator whose final decision should be responsive to the dispute as pre-
sented." I IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOwICH,
FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 2.6.1, at 2:37 n.1 (1994) (citing Lon Fuller, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 363-64 (1978)); see
also JOHN S. MURRAY, ALAN SCOTT RAU & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, PROCESSES
OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 500 (2d ed. 1996) (characterizing arbitration as "the
process of private adjudication"); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Adjudication As a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 235 (1979) ("[E]ven
today much adjudication is private (commercial arbitration being an impor-
tant example)."). Unfortunately, even some of the most thoughtful arbitration
scholars contrast "arbitration" with "adjudication." See Lisa Bernstein, Opt-
ing Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 148 (1992) ("[A]rbitration has important
substantive and procedural advantages over adjudication."); see also Harry T.
Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 668, 676 (1986) ("In strictly private disputes, ADR mechanisms such as
arbitration often are superior to adjudication."); Judith Resnik, Many Doors?
Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 222-28 (1995); Michael Hunter Schwartz, From Star
19991 707
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cation, while litigation is government adjudication. In both
processes, a non-party decisionmaker resolves the dispute. In
arbitration, the decisionmaker is one or more arbitrators; in
litigation it is the court, i.e., a judge and, sometimes, a jury.
Adjudication typically produces winners and losers, and
the losers may refuse to comply with the adjudicator's decision.
When losers defy the ruling of a court, the process for enforce-
ment is well-known. The sheriff or marshal enforces the
court's ruling by seizing property, putting a person in jail, or
forcibly enjoining a person from doing something.13 The same
enforcement process occurs when the loser at arbitration defies
the arbitrator's decision. The winner at arbitration petitions
the court for an order confirming the arbitration award.14
Through confirmation, the court adopts the arbitrator's deci-
sion as its own, and that decision is enforced like any other
ruling of the court.1 5
In light of the great power this gives arbitrators, many
people may wish to keep their disputes out of arbitration. They
are free to do so. Disputes go to arbitration only with the con-
sent of all parties to the dispute16 This fundamental principle
to Supernova to Dark, Cold Neutron Star: The Early Life, the Explosion and
the Collapse of Arbitration, 22 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994) ("[Tlhe solutions
for arbitration's ills necessarily will involve adapting procedures from adjudi-
cation to arbitration."); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case
of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259, 263-69 (comparing arbitra-
tion with adjudication).
13. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 15.7-8, at 708-
15 (2d ed. 1993).
14. See IV MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 12, § 38.1.1, at
38:1 (Supp. 1996).
15. See id.
16. As the Supreme Court puts it, "arbitration is a matter of contract and
a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has
not agreed so to submit." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960); see also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,
514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) ("[Arbitration is simply a matter of contract between
the parties; it is a way to resolve those disputes-but only those disputes-
that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.").
Courts use a number of forms of alternative dispute resolution such as
mediation, neutral expert fact-finding, mini-trials, settlement conferences and
summary jury trials. See I MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 12,§ 2.4.1, at 2:29 (Supp. 1994). One of the programs used by many courts is
"court-annexed arbitration." Id. at 2:30 (Supp. 1994). These proceedings
"deviate[ ] sharply" from contractual dispute resolution in two respects. Id.
First, disputes go to court-annexed arbitration, not because the parties con-
tracted for such a process, but because the court system imposed it. See id.
Second, a party who does not wish to comply with an arbitral award has a
[Vol. 83:703
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of arbitration law yields the axiom that "arbitration is a crea-
ture of contract." 7 Unless you have contracted to send your
dispute to arbitration, you will not be relegated to arbitration.
The courthouse door will remain open for you to litigate. On
the other hand, if you do agree to arbitrate, that agreement
will be enforceable. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),18
which applies to virtually all arbitration agreements, 9 requires
courts to enforce arbitration agreements "save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."20
While the usual remedy for breach of contract is money
damages, 2' courts enforce arbitration agreements with the
remedy of specific performance.22 Consider, for example, a con-
tract for the sale of a car to a consumer. Assume the contract
contains a clause obligating its signatories to arbitrate, rather
than litigate, any dispute arising out of the transaction. As-
suming there is no generally applicable contract defense, this
arbitration agreement will be enforced by specific performance.
So if the consumer sues the seller, the suit will be stayed.23
The consumer may prevail, if at all, only through arbitration.
Bringing suit breaches the agreement to arbitrate, rather than
litigate, and the court orders the consumer to perform that
agreement by closing the courthouse door.24
right to a trial de novo if the award was rendered by a court-annexed arbitra-
tor, but not if it was rendered by an arbitrator chosen by contract. See id.
17. See, e.g., Fils et Cables D'Acier de Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584
F. Supp. 240, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). A search on July 10, 1998 for the phrase
"arbitration is a creature of contract" in the Westlaw ALLCASES database
yielded 177 cases.
18. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
19. The FAA extends to the limit permitted by the U.S. Constitution's
Commerce Clause. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,
273-74 (1995). There is an exception regarding labor and employment agree-
ments. See Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Con-
sent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 94 (1996).
20. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
21 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.8, at 871 (2d ed. 1990).
22. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1994).
23. See id. § 3.
24. If the consumer seeks to arbitrate and the seller refuses to partici-
pate, a court will order the seller to do so. See id. § 4. This order is another
example of specific performance.
1999]
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B. MUST ARBITRATORS APPLY THE LAW?
1. Converting Mandatory Rules into Default Rules
As discussed in Part I, when contracts are enforced, pri-
vately-created rights and duties replace whatever government-
created rights and duties would otherwise apply. Those other-
wise-applicable rights and duties derive from default rules. In
contrast, rights and duties derived from mandatory rules can-
not be replaced with privately-created rights and duties. Con-
tracts purporting to do this are not enforceable. Therefore, one
can identify which laws are default and which are mandatory
by examining the sorts of contract terms 25 that are, and are
not, enforceable. For example, the tort law giving me the right
not to be punched in the nose is a default rule because I can
make an enforceable contract to enter a boxing match.26 The
law on nose-punching is privatizable. In contrast, the law
giving a consumer the right to buy safe goods27 is mandatory
because it applies no matter what the contract terms say.28
The law on product safety is not privatizable. Nor is it alone in
this respect. An enormous amount of state and federal law is
ordinarily believed to be mandatory, i.e., unaffected by con-
25. It is also possible to determine those laws that are default and those
that are mandatory by looking to other privately-created law. See supra note
5.
26. Technically, it is not the contract that privatizes the law on nose-
punching, it is the "consent" doctrine of tort law. See W. PAGE KEETON ETAL.,
supra note 7, § 18, at 112, 114 ("Consent ordinarily bars recovery for inten-
tional interferences with person or property... One who enters into a sport,
game or contest may be taken to consent to physical contacts consistent with
the understood rules of the game."). Contract cannot privatize the law on in-
tentional torts beyond the privatization inherent in the tort law doctrine of
consent. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 21, §5.2, at 353 n.17 ("A party clearly
cannot exempt itself from liability in tort for harm that it causes intentionally
or recklessly... However, if the victim effectively consents, there may be no
tort.").
In some jurisdictions in which boxing is illegal, the law on nose-punching
is not privatizable. See, e.g., Hart v. Geysel, 294 P. 570 (Wash. 1930). See
generally Ian Forman, Boxing in the Legal Arena, 3 SPORTS L.J. 75 (1996)(exploring the history of and the legal issues surrounding boxing); Peter E.
Millspaugh, The Federal Regulation of Professional Boxing: Will Congress An-
swer the Bell?, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 33, 41-42 (1994) ("Florty-two states
and the District of Columbia have come to regulate boxing. At this writing,
the sport remains legal but unregulated in the remaining eight states.").
27. Safe goods are those goods not "in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
28. See supra note 10.
710 [Vol. 83:703
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tract.29 But this belief fails to account for arbitration. Manda-
tory law is jeopardized by the enforcement of arbitration
agreements. The enforcement of arbitration agreements effec-
tively converts what would otherwise be mandatory law into
default law.
To see this, consider what happens when arbitrators do
not apply the law to the cases before them. Those arbitration
decisions are likely to be enforced anyhow.30 Courts do not
closely review arbitration awards to ensure that arbitrators
apply the law.3 1 And even if a court discovers that an arbitra-
tion award does not apply the law, the court will likely confirm
the award. Only in rare cases does a court vacate an arbitra-
tion award because of the arbitrator's legal error.32 Outside
these rare cases, an agreement to arbitrate is, in effect, an
agreement to comply with the arbitrator's decision whether or
not the arbitrator applies the law. Such an agreement, then,
contracts out of all the law that would have been applied by a
court but for the agreement. All such law, in effect, consists of
default rules because arbitration agreements are enforced. 33
All such law is privatizable.
While an arbitration agreement contracts out of all the law
that would have been applied by a court, that law may still be
applied by the arbitrator. The arbitrator may even apply that
law more aggressively than a court would have. Contracting
out of law through arbitration agreements does not necessarily
mean that such law will be under-enforced in the sense that
plaintiffs "do worse" in arbitration than they would have done
in court. In some cases, arbitrators reach a more "pro-plaintiff"
result than a court would have reached; in others, arbitrators
reach a more "pro-defendant" result than a court would have
29. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
30. See infra Part H.B.3.
31. See infra Part II.B.3.
32. See infra notes 85-100 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Part M.A. If a particular law is enforced by a government
agency, as well as private plaintiffs, then the arbitration agreement contracts
out of it only to the extent it is enforced by private plaintiffs. As Paul Car-
rington and Paul Haagen put it, the enforcement of arbitration agreements
allows parties "to contract out of effective private enforcement of regulations
adverse to their interests." Paul D. Carrington & Paul Haagen, Contract and
Jurisdiction, 1996 SuP. CT. REv. 331, 338 (emphasis added).
1999]
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reached. We cannot know which of these deviations occurs
more often. 34
To reiterate, an agreement to arbitrate is, in effect, an
agreement to comply With the arbitrator's decision whether or
not the arbitrator applies the law. Such an agreement, then,
contracts out of all the law that would have been applied by a
court but for the agreement.
2. The Supreme Court's Denial
The Supreme Court denies that arbitration agreements
contract out of substantive, as opposed to procedural, law.35
Understanding this denial requires a bit of history.
For centuries, arbitration has been widely used among
merchants to resolve commercial disputes.36 The prevalence of
arbitration is especially strong with respect to international
commercial and maritime matters.3 7 And since the enactment
of federal labor legislation in the 1930's, arbitration has be-
come the primary means of resolving disputes between labor
unions and employers.38 Only recently, however, has arbitra-
tion become significant outside the commercial and labor ar-
eas.39 This expansion was largely driven by the Supreme
34. At best, we have the impressions of lawyers and parties who fre-
quently litigate and arbitrate similar cases. These lawyers and parties may
have impressions such as "plaintiffs in X sort of case do better in arbitration
than litigation" or "plaintiffs in Y sort of case do worse in arbitration than liti-
gation." These impressions are unscientific because no two cases are identi-
cal. Factual differences between cases, rather than differences between arbi-
trators and courts, may account for the results.
35. See infra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., William C. Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration
in New York: A Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q. 193 (exploring the history of
arbitration in New York).
37. See, e.g., MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note 12, at 529 ("[In in-
ternational commercial contracts, arbitration clauses 'not only predominatebut are nowadays almost universal' and are 'virtually taken for granted.')(quoting The Hon. Mr. Justice Kerr, International Arbitration v. Litigation,
1980 J. Bus. L. 164, 165, 171).
38. See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E.A. SANDER & NANCY H.
ROGERS, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION AND OTHER
PROCESSES 199 (2d ed. 1992).
39. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473U.S. 614, 650 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to "the undisputed his-
torical fact that arbitration has functioned almost entirely in either the area
of labor disputes or in 'ordinary disputes between merchants as to questions of
fact'").
[Vol. 83:703
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Court. The Court's arbitration decisions over the last twenty-
five years greatly expanded the scope of arbitrable claims.
40
An arbitrable claim is one with respect to which a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement will be enforced. 41 Consider, for
example, a contract between Buyer and Seller containing the
following standard arbitration clause:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or
the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration administered by the
American Arbitration Association42 under its Commercial Arbitration
Rules, and judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may
be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
If a dispute arises and one party seeks to litigate, while the
other seeks to arbitrate, a court will have to decide whether to
hear the case or to order arbitration. Assuming there is no
generally applicable contract defense, a court will order arbi-
tration if, for example, Seller alleges that Buyer failed to pay,
or Buyer alleges that Seller breached a warranty. By sending
contract and warranty claims to arbitration over the objection
of a party, a court holds that such claims are arbitrable.
But what if Buyer alleges that Seller violated the antitrust
laws? Until recently, courts held that antitrust claims were
not arbitrable. 43 That is, if either party sought to litigate
rather than arbitrate the antitrust claim, a court would have
heard the antitrust claim on the merits, rather than ordering
arbitration of it. In our example, the court probably would
have conceded that Buyer and Seller agreed to arbitrate
Buyer's antitrust claim because it, like the contract and war-
ranty claims, "ar[ose] out of' the contract. But the court would
have refused to enforce the agreement to arbitrate antitrust
claims on the grounds that enforcement would violate "public
40. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
41. The distinction between pre- and post-dispute agreements to arbitrate
is discussed infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
42. See generally AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION RULES (1993).
43. See, e.g., American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391
F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1968) (declaring antitrust claims "inappropriate for ar-
bitration"). But see Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 640 (holding an
agreement to arbitrate a claim arising under the Sherman Antitrust Act en-
forceable). For an interesting discussion of arbitration as a tool of cartels, see
Heinrich Kronstein, Business Arbitration-Instrument of Private Government,
54 YALE L.J. 36 (1944).
1999]
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policy." In other words, courts held that antitrust claims were
inarbitrable.4
Antitrust claims were not alone in this regard. Other
claims that courts held to be inarbitrable included: securities,45
RICO,46 patent,4 7 copyright,48 "non-core" bankruptcy proceed-
ings,49 Title VII,50 ADEA,51 and ERISA.52 With these statutory
claims excluded, arbitration was primarily a method of resolv-
ing contract claims. This is not surprising given the two tradi-
tional contexts of arbitration: commerce and labor.53 The typi-
cal dispute in both contexts centers on contract: merchants
44. This Article discusses "subject matter" arbitrability, as opposed to
"contractual" arbitrability. The latter is the case-by-case question of whether
the particular contract sends to arbitration all claims or only some types of
claims. The most important issue regarding contractual arbitrability is who,
court or arbitrator, decides whether a claim is arbitrable.
[Most countries' laws] contain the kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine, un-
der which arbitral tribunals are given the authority to rule initially
at least upon questions of contractual inarbitrability. These determi-
nations are subject to judicial review... at the stage of enforcement
when a final award can be challenged on the basis of an invalid or
non-existent arbitration agreement or for excess of arbitral authority.
Thomas E. Carbonneau, Beyond Trilogies: A New Bill of Rights and Law
Practice Through the Contract of Arbitration, 6 AM. REV. INTL ARB. 1, 17(1995). In contrast, the FAA sends contractual arbitrability decisions to
courts, rather than arbitrators, see 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994), but this is a default
rule so the parties can agree to have contractual arbitrability decided by the
arbitrator. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 946-47
(1995).
45. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,438 (1953).
46. See Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d
291, 298-300 (1st Cir. 1986). "RICO" is an abbreviation for "Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations." 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994).
47. See Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55,
63 (7th Cir. 1970).
48. See Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 522 F. Supp. 125,
137 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 684 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1982).
49. See Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines, 712 F.2d 55, 59 (3rd Cir.
1983). But see Hays and Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
885 F.2d 1149, 1155 (3d Cir. 1989) (overruling and holding that non-core
bankruptcy proceedings are arbitrable). A core proceeding involves "the ad-
ministration of the estate; the allowance of claims against the estate; the
voidance of preferences or fraudulent transfers; determinations as to dis-
chargeability of debts; priorities of liens; or the confirmation of a plan." Id. at
1156 n.9.
50. See Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1989).
51. See Nicholson v. CPC Intl Inc., 877 F.2d 221,231 (3rd Cir. 1989).
52. See Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 941 (3d
Cir. 1985).
53. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
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allege breach of sales contracts, while labor unions allege
breach of collective bargaining agreements. Until about
twenty-five years ago, arbitration seemed largely confined to
contract claims and little attention was given to the question of
whether non-contract claims were arbitrable.5 4 Then the Su-
preme Court revolutionized arbitration law.55
Over the last twenty-five years, the Supreme Court drasti-
cally reduced the scope of the public policy defense to arbitra-
tion.56 In other words, the Court drastically increased the vari-
ety of arbitrable claims. Virtually all claims are now
arbitrable.57 Thus arbitration has "moved from the role of
commercial court to that of a civil court of general jurisdic-
tion."58
A crucial step in the reasoning of the Court's decisions ex-
panding arbitrability is that "the streamlined procedures of ar-
bitration do not entail any consequential restriction on sub-
stantive rights. 59 This point is essential to the Court's
54. Cf. Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and
Employees, 64 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 449, 462-64 (1996) (explaining that common
law courts rarely had occasion to address noncommercial arbitration and
would have been skeptical of it); Stempel, supra note 12, at 273 (discussing
arbitration in early America and noting that no "personal injury actions, em-
ployer-employee disputes, or landlord-tenant disputes" arose during that
time).
55. See generally IAN R. MACNEIL, AIERICAN ARBITRATION LAw 134-55
(1992) (discussing the history of arbitration since 1938, focusing on changes in
the past 30 years).
56. "[T1he public policy defense is dead under the FAA, unless [in a par-
ticular statute] Congress has made plain to the contrary." I1 MACNEIL,
SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 12, § 16.3.3.1, at 16:41.
57. See id. § 16. The Ninth Circuit, however, recently concluded that the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 renders Title VII claims inarbitrable. See Duffield v.
Robinson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1199 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Congress in-
tended to preclude compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims."); accord Win-
kler v. Pacific Brokerage Servs., Inc., No. 97 C 7340, 1998 WL 341622 (N.D.
IM. June 19, 1998); Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243 (S.D.N.Y.
1998); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp.
190 (D. Mass. 1998). The majority of circuit courts ruling since the 1991 Civil
Rights Act have found that Title VII claims are arbitrable. See Seus v. John
Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998); Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105
F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc.,
78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir. 1994); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971
F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992).
58. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization
of Arbitration, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1997).
59. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,232 (1987).
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conclusion that claims such as antitrust, securities, and em-
ployment discrimination are arbitrable.60 If an agreement to
arbitrate one of these claims did entail a "restriction on sub-
stantive rights," the Court would not enforce the agreement be-
cause the statutes conferring the rights are indisputably man-
datory, not default, rules. 61 For example, in Mitsubishi Motors
Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.,62 the Court held
that antitrust claims were arbitrable. The Court explicitly
rested its holding on the premise that the arbitrators would
apply federal antitrust statutes to the dispute and that a court
would grant a motion to vacate the arbitration award if the ar-
bitrators did not apply them.63
60. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985) ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."). The Court also
cited this proposition in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc.,
490 U.S. 477, 483-84 (1989) (holding that a claim arising under the Securities
Act of 1933 may be subject to a pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agree-
ment), and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991)(holding that a claim brought under the ADEA was subject to a pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration agreement).
61. Some federal statutes expressly state that they are mandatory rules.
For instance, the Securities Act of 1933 declares void "[any condition, stipula-
tion, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compli-
ance with any provision of [the Act]." 15 U.S.C. § 77(n) (1994). The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 has the same language. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(cc)(a) (1994).
Other statutes do not expressly say whether they are mandatory or de-
fault rules, but courts have interpreted them to be mandatory. The employ-
ment discrimination statutes are examples of such statutes. See, e.g., MACK
A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 5.84 (1988); David S.
Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Con-
sumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV.
33, 111.
62. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
63. Mitsubishi involved a sales agreement between Mitsubishi, a Japa-
nese car manufacturer, and Soler, a Puerto Rican corporation. See id. at 616-
617. The agreement stated that it "will be governed by and construed in all
respects according to the laws of the Swiss Confederation," id. at 637 n.19,
and provided for disputes to "be finally settled by arbitration in Japan in ac-
cordance with the rules and regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration
Association." Id. at 617 (citing the parties' sales agreement). When a dispute
arose, Mitsubishi sued Soler seeking an order compelling arbitration. See id.
at 618-19. Soler counterclaimed, asserting a variety of claims including one
alleging that Mitsubishi had violated the Sherman Act. See id. at 619-20.
The Supreme Court held that Soler's antitrust claim was arbitrable. In
doing so, it considered the possibility that "the arbitrators could consider
Soler's [antitrust claim] to fall within the purview of th[e] choice-of-law provi-
sion, with the result that it would be decided under Swiss law rather than the
U.S. Sherman Act." Id. at 637 n.19. The Court said this was unlikely to occur
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Mitsubishi and other decisions expanding arbitrability
follow from the Court's view of arbitration clauses as "a spe-
cialized kind of forum-selection clause."64 A forum-selection
clause specifies the forum to resolve a dispute; it does not
specify the law the forum will apply to the dispute.65 In con-
trast, a choice-of-law clause does the opposite;66 it specifies the
governing law, but does not specify the forum that will resolve
the dispute.67 As every forum has its own procedures, forum-
selection clauses specify the procedural law to be used, and
choice-of-law clauses specify the substantive law.6 8 A contract
might include a forum-selection clause, a choice-of-law clause,
neither or both.
The Court conceives of arbitration clauses as forum-
selection clauses, but not as choice-of-law clauses.69 In the
Court's view then, an arbitration clause specifies the proce-
dural law to be used in resolving a dispute, but not the sub-
stantive law to be used. With respect to substantive law, Mit-
subishi indicates that arbitrators must apply the same
substantive law a court would apply.70 Similarly, in Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,71 the Court held that
claims under the Securities Exchange Act were arbitrable be-
because "counsel for Mitsubishi conceded that American law applied to the
antitrust claims." Id. Thus the Court believed that, in the case at hand, little
danger existed that the arbitrators would interpret the arbitration clause, in
combination with the Swiss choice-of-law clause, as contracting out of the
Sherman Act. See id. As guidance for future cases, however, the Court cau-
tioned that "in the event the choice-of-forum [arbitration] and choice-of-law
clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pur-
sue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation
in condemning the agreement as against public policy." Id. Finally, "courts of
the United States will have the opportunity at the award-enforcement stage
to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws
has been addressed." Id. at 638.
64. Scherkv. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974).
65. See, e.g., Johnston County v. R.N. Rouse & Co., 414 S.E.2d 30, 33
(N.C. 1992). See also Leandra Lederman, Note, Viva Zapata!: Toward a Ra-
tional System of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 422,423 n.10 (1991).
66. See R.N. Rouse & Co., 414 S.E.2d at 33.
67. See id.
68. "[D]istinctions do not lack respectability because they are not abso-
lute: substance and procedure differ even if, at the margin, they become diffi-
cult to distinguish." Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the
Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 284.
69. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
71. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
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cause "although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards neces-
sarily is limited, such review is sufficient to ensure that arbi-
trators comply with the requirements of the statute."72 The
Court often says that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by
the statute."73 That statement has to mean that arbitrators
must apply the statute as governing substantive law. Other-
wise, the arbitrator would be depriving a party of the substan-
tive rights afforded by the statute.
There is nothing in the Court's reasoning to confine it to
statutory law. By agreeing to arbitrate a common law claim,
does a party forgo the substantive rights afforded by the com-
mon law? The Court has not addressed this question, but
nothing in the Court's reasoning indicates it would treat com-
mon law rights differently from statutory rights. Both are sub-
stantive law. And the Court views an agreement to arbitrate
as an agreement about procedural law, not one about substan-
tive law.74 Therefore, the Court's view seems to be that arbi-
trators must apply the same substantive law, statutory or
common law, that a court would apply.75
To say that arbitrators must apply the same law a court
would apply does not identify the body of law (e.g., New York
law or French law) arbitrators must apply in a particular case.
The "law a court would apply" will not always be easily identi-
fied. In fact, the entire area of law known as "Conflicts of
Laws" is devoted to identifying which government's laws a
72. Id. at 232. "The literal impact of this language would require a court
to assess whether a securities arbitrator has complied with the various securi-
ties statutes applicable to the dispute." Edward Brunet, Toward Changing
Models of Securities Arbitration, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1459, 1474 (1996).
73. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,229 (1987); see
also Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1459 (11th Cir.
1997) (quoting this statement to support the proposition that "[wihen a claim
arises under specific laws.., the arbitrators are bound to follow those laws in
the absence of a valid and legal agreement not to do so"); Michael A. Scodro,
Note, Arbitrating Novel Legal Questions: A Recommendation for Reform, 105
YALE L.J. 1927, 1946 (1996) (noting that the Supreme Court's view that arbi-
tration does not alter substantive rights "is in keeping with the courts' expec-
tation that arbitrators will follow applicable legal rulings").
74. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
75. Leading arbitration scholars seem to share this view. See H
MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 12, § 36.3.2.2, at 36:30 (noting
that there is "no justification for interpreting an ordinary arbitration clause as
a waiver of substantive rights-it is a waiver of the right to normal judicial
processes, and that is all").
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court will apply to a particular case and the answer sometimes
depends on which court is the forum.76
Putting aside the point that the "law a court would apply"
will not always be easily identified, we can return to the Su-
preme Court's view that, whatever that law is, an arbitrator
must apply it. For simplicity, the rest of this Article does not
refer to the Supreme Court's view as "arbitrators must apply
the law a court would apply." It refers to the Court's view as
"arbitrators must apply the law." It should be remembered
that the term "the law" does not imply there is only one body of
substantive law applied by all courts. Rather, "the law" is
shorthand for "the law a court would apply," with all the Con-
flicts issues that raises.77
3. Arbitrators Often Do Not Apply the Law
While the Supreme Court's arbitrability decisions are
premised on arbitrators applying the law, arbitrators often do
not. Soia Mentschikoffs seminal survey of arbitrators found
that eighty percent of the studied commercial arbitrators
"thought that they ought to reach their decisions within the
context of the principles of substantive rules of law, but almost
ninety percent believed that they were free to ignore these
rules whenever they thought that more just decisions would be
76. EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1-3 (2d ed.
1992). Many choice-of-law "rules" are flexible enough that the "law a court
would apply" will often depend on which court hears a particular case. See id.
§ 2.11. For example, given a particular set of facts, a New York court would
apply New York law while, given the same set of facts, an Alabama court
would apply Alabama law. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22,
24-25 (1988).
77. The Court may envision arbitrators applying the choice-of-law rules of
the forum state, just as a federal court does. A federal court sitting in Dela-
ware, for example, applies Delaware's choice-of-law rules to determine what
government's substantive law to apply. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). Perhaps the Court envisions an arbitrator sit-
ting in Delaware doing the same thing.
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reached by so doing."78 A more recent survey of construction
arbitrators found that twenty-eight percent of surveyed arbi-
trators reported that they do not always follow the law in for-
mulating their awards.7 9 And among labor arbitrators, the
"orthodox" position is that arbitrators should adhere to the
collective bargaining agreement and "ignore the law."80 The
widespread belief among arbitrators that they are under no
duty to apply the law is consistent with standard expectations
about arbitration because "we do not... expect that an arbi-
trator will decide a case the way a judge does. We do not ex-
pect that he will necessarily 'follow the law'-or indeed apply
or develop any body of general rules as a guide to his deci-
sion."81 Even courts have explicitly acknowledged that arbitra-
tors often do not apply the law.82 In short, the widespread be-
78. Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846,
861 (1961).
The practice of commercial arbitration in the United States is indeed
that the arbitrator has the freedom of determining the disputed ques-
tions according to his sense of the justice of the case. Unless parties
expressly or impliedly wish the arbitrator to determine the question
by application of a specific law, the arbitrator appears free to resolve
the dispute on the basis of his just and fair appreciation.
I GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOM=E ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 25.01, at 391
(rev. ed. 1995).
79. Dean B. Thomson, Arbitration Theory and Practice: A Survey of AAA
Construction Arbitrators, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 137, 154-55 (1994).
80. MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note 12, at 636; see also IV
MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 12, § 40.5.2.4, at 40:47; Harry
T. Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: An Empirical
Study, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 59 (1975); Patricia A. Greenfield, How
Do Arbitrators Treat External Law?, 45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 683, 688
(1992).
81. MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note 12, at 514; accord Edward
Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 85 (1992)("The weight of authority permits an arbitrator to 'do justice as he sees it' and
fashion an award that embodies the individual justice required by a given set
of facts."); Mentschikoff, supra note 78, at 867 (stating that arbitrators "must
make their own selection of the most appropriate norms for the particular
dispute").
82. See, e.g., Bowles Fin. Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d
1010, 1011 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Arbitration provides neither the procedural pro-
tections nor the assurance of the proper application of substantive law offered
by the judicial system.... One choosing arbitration should not expect the full
panoply of procedural and substantive protection offered by a court of law.");
Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., 783 F.2d 743, 751 n.12 (8th Cir. 1986)("IT]he arbitration system is an inferior system of justice, structured without
due process, rules of evidence, accountability of judgment and rules of law.");
In re Sprinzen and Nomberg, 415 N.Y.S.2d 974, 976 (1979) ("[The arbitrator
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lief among arbitrators that they are under no duty to apply the
law is consistent with the standard view that many parties
choose arbitration because it provides a less legalistic process
than litigation.83 And even those arbitrators who try to apply
the law will sometimes fail; they will make honest mistakes of
law. In both of these cases-conscious disregard of the law and
honest mistakes about the law-the arbitrator has not applied
the law. In neither of these cases, however, is a court likely to
vacate the arbitrator's award.84 In sum, an arbitration award
that does not apply the law will probably be confirmed by
courts.
In most cases in which an arbitrator does not apply the
law, it will be virtually impossible for a court to discover that
the arbitrator did not apply the law. Arbitrators generally do
not write reasoned opinions explaining their decisions. 5 Nor is
it "common practice to make a record or transcript of the pro-
is not bound to abide by, absent a contrary provision in the arbitration agree-
ment, those principles of substantive law or rules of procedure which govern
the traditional litigation process."); Lentine v. Fundaro, 278 N.E.2d 633, 635
(N.Y. 1972) ("Absent provision to the contrary in the arbitration agreement,
arbitrators are not bound by principles of substantive law."); Aimcee Whole-
sale Corp. v. Tomar Prod., Inc., 237 N.E.2d 223, 225 (N.Y. 1968) ("Arbitrators
are not bound by rules of law."); Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899,
919 (Cal. 1992) ("[Tlhe existence of an error of law apparent on the face of the
award that causes substantial injustice does not provide grounds for judicial
review."); see also Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1953) ("[W]hile it
may be true that arbitrators do not ordinarily consider themselves bound to
decide strictly according to legal rules, there can be no doubt that they are so
bound if the arbitration agreement so provides."), rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953),
overruled in part by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477 (1989); Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir.
1972) (noting that arbitration involves a "sacrifice... in terms of legal preci-
sion").
83. "It is often said that the parties do not expect the arbitrators to make
their decision according to rules but rather, especially when the arbitrators
are not lawyers, on the basis of their experience, knowledge of the customs of
the trade, and fair and good sense for equitable relief." See WILNER, supra
note 78, § 25:01, at 391. For a more negative characterization of arbitrators'
failure to apply the law, see generally Heinrich Kronstein, Arbitration Is
Power, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 661 (1963).
84. For a discussion of judicial review of arbitration decisions, see infra
notes 85-100.
85. See I MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 12, § 3.2.3, at
3:13; 1I id. § 37.4.1, at 37:10. "Only in a few, specialized types of arbitrations
do arbitrators routinely craft written decisions-labor arbitrations, interna-
tional commercial arbitrations, and maritime arbitrations." EDWARD BRUNET
& CHARLES B. CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ADVOCATE'S
PERSPECTIVE 324 (1997).
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ceedings. 86 As one apparently disgruntled judge reviewing an
arbitration award put it:
[Aifter four years and sixty-four days, the arbitrators simply awarded
$14 million to [the plaintiff] without any explanation whatsoever
other than a finding that [the defendant] had "failed to properly per-
form its obligations as construction manager pursuant to the con-
tract.... ." There are no reasons, no findings of fact, no conclusions
of law, nothing other than the foregoing. For all we know, the arbi-
trators concluded that the sun rises in the west, the earth is flat, and
damages have nothing to do with the intentions of the parties or the
foreseeability of the consequences of a breach.8 7
The absence of a record and reasoned opinions, combined
with the very limited grounds on which courts may vacate arbi-
tration awards, 88 results in extremely few awards being va-
cated.89 The confidence parties have in the finality of arbitra-
86. MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note 12, at 640.
87. Perini Corp. v. Great Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 610 A.2d 364, 392
(N.J. 1992) (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
88. The FAA provides:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and
for the district wherein the award was made may make an order va-
cating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitra-
tion-
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or un-
due means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbi-
trators, or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing
to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing
to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been preju-
diced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imper-
fectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon
the subject matter submitted was not made.
(5) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the
agreement required the award to be made has not expired the court
may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994).
89. "The conventional wisdom is that successful challenges to arbitration
awards are rare." MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note 12, at 624. Accord
IV MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 12, § 40.1.4, at 40:13 ("Over
the years, the courts have taken a fairly uniform approach to awards: Awards
should be confirmed and enforced as is unless there is clear evidence of a
gross impropriety."). The law may be changing so that the absence of rea-
soned opinions hinders, rather than helps, the finality of arbitration awards.
See, e.g., Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998)("[W]here a reviewing court is inclined to find that arbitrators manifestly dis-
regarded the law or the evidence and that an explanation, if given, would have
strained credulity, the absence of explanation may reinforce the reviewing
court's confidence that the arbitrators engaged in manifest disregard.").
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tion encourages parties to agree to arbitration in the first
place; if more awards were vacated, arbitration would become
more costly in terms of time and money.90 The standard policy
rationale for judicial deference to arbitration awards unsup-
ported by a record or reasoned opinion is that arbitration
should be a substitute for litigation, not a prelude to litigation.
While most cases of arbitrators failing to apply the law
probably go undetected by courts, sometimes a court will real-
ize that an award does not apply the law. In such a case, a
court will likely confirm the award. Courts confirm arbitration
awards that do not apply the law because "error of law" is not a
ground for vacating them.91 This point cannot be emphasized
too strongly. Courts confirm and enforce arbitration awards
even when the courts acknowledge that the arbitrators got the
law wrong.
90. See Sargent v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 882 F.2d 529,
532-33 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (The absence of a duty to explain is presumably one of
the reasons why arbitration should be faster and cheaper than an ordinary
lawsuit." The interest "in assuring that judgment be swift and economical...
must generally prevail" over any interest "in rooting out possible error."); So-
bel v. Hertz Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972) ("[A] require-
ment that arbitrators explain their reasoning in every case would help to un-
cover egregious failures to apply the law to an arbitrated dispute. But such a
rule would undermine the very purpose of arbitration, which is to provide a
relatively quick, efficient and informal means of private dispute settlement.");
MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note 12, at 623 (asserting that if arbitration
is "to function as an efficient process of private dispute resolution-to realize
the benefits of expert decision-making with reduced cost and delay-litigation
challenging the process, or aimed at upsetting the resulting award, must be
minimized").
9L See, e.g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, 943 F.2d 1056, 1060
(9th Cir. 1991) ("[C]onfirmation is required even in the face of erroneous...
misinterpretations of law.... It is not enough that the Panel may have failed
to understand or apply the law... An arbitrator's decision must be upheld
unless it is completely irrational, or it constitutes a manifest disregard for the
law.") (internal citations omitted); Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8 (1st
Cir. 1990) (stating that courts are not authorized to reconsider the merits of
arbitration awards "[elven where such error is painfully clear"); Miller v. Pru-
dential Bache Secs., 884 F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that "mere" er-
ror of law is insufficient to set aside arbitrator's award); Moseley, Hallgarten,
Estabrook & Weeden, Inc. v. Ellis, 849 F.2d 264, 272 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding
that "mistake" of law is insufficient to vacate arbitration award); Siegel v. Ti-
tan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 892-93 (2nd Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (stating
that erroneous application of rules of law is not a ground for vacating an arbi-
trator's award"); Collins v. Aiknan Floor Coverings, 736 F. Supp. 480, 485-86
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that error of law was not "manifest"). But see Cole v.
Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that
courts have the authority to review arbitrator's award). See also infra notes
163-69 and accompanying text.
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There are circumstances in which a court will vacate an
arbitration award for failure to apply the law, but these cir-
cumstances are very rare. Courts will only vacate an award
because the arbitrators got the law wrong if (1) the "arbitrators
deliberately disregarded what they knew to be the law in order
to reach the result they did,"92 or (2) enforcement of the award
would violate public policy.93 The first of these grounds is
known as a "manifest disregard" of law.9 4 "In terms of outcome
of judicial decisions.., the [manifest disregard] doctrine seems
singularly unimportant. It is nearly impossible to find FAA
arbitration decisions where application of the doctrine has re-
sulted in upsetting of an award."95 There are few cases in
which a court can say with confidence that an arbitrator has
manifestly disregarded the law.
The error must have been obvious and capable of being readily and
instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an ar-
bitrator. Moreover, the term 'disregard' implies that the arbitrator
appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but
decides to ignore or pay no attention to it.9
So not only does the arbitrator have to make an egregious er-
ror, the arbitrator must do so while consciously disregarding
the correct law. If the arbitrator makes an egregious error out
of ignorance, rather than defiance-"pure heart, empty head"-
there is no manifest disregard of law.97
The sort of "pure heart, empty head" error of law that does
not satisfy the "manifest disregard" doctrine might be vacated
on the ground that its enforcement would violate "public pol-
92. Health Servs. Management Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th
Cir. 1992).
93. See infra note 98.
94. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) ("[Ifnterpretations of
the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in
the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation."), overruled by
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). See
generally IV MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 12, § 40.7, at
40:80-40:96; Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Va-
catur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 774-78 (1996).
95. IV MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 12, § 40.7.1, at
40:85; accord THOMAS OEHME, COMMERcIAL ARBITRATION § 4.28, at 103
(1987).
96. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930,
933 (2d Cir. 1986). The Second Circuit may have recently strayed from this
view of "manifest disregard." See infra note 169.
97. See Hayford, supra note 94, at 817-18.
724 [Vol. 83:703
PRIVATIZING LAW
icy."98 Outside of collective bargaining arbitration, courts
rarely vacate arbitration awards on public policy grounds. 99 It
is difficult, therefore, to predict which public policies are im-
portant enough to warrant vacating arbitration awards that
violate them. Clearly, however, any public policy in favor of
arbitrators applying the law does not rise to this level. As
stated above, "error of law" is not a ground for vacating
awards. 00 An arbitrator's failure to apply the law, without
more, does not violate public policy.
C. CONCLUSION: ARBITRATION PRIVATIZES SUBSTANTIVE LAW
A major conclusion follows from the fact that arbitrators
often do not apply the law. The Supreme Court is simply
wrong when it asserts that "the streamlined procedures of ar-
bitration do not entail any consequential restriction on sub-
stantive rights."'01 As I wrote some years ago, an enforceable
arbitration agreement
necessarily entails a waiver of substantive rights unless courts vacate
arbitral awards when arbitrators make errors of law. That courts
confirm arbitral awards even when arbitrators make errors of law
shows that arbitration agreements constitute waivers of substantive
rights. An uncorrected error of law, by definition, deprives a party of
the substantive right that would have been vindicated by a correct
application of the law. Courts do not correct errors of law, that is,
deprivations of substantive rights, by arbitrators, because courts
treat an agreement to arbitrate as a waiver of those substantive
rights.Iu
Other scholars have reached similar, albeit less stark, conclu-
sions.103
98. See id. at 784; IV MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 12, §
40.8.1, at 40:96-40:98 (explaining the public policy defense).
99. See generally IV MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 12, §
40.8, at 40:96-40:104.
100. See supra note 91.
101. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232(1987); see also Carrington & Haagen, supra note 33, at 349 ("No matter how
frequently the Court may insist on this view, it is, for the reasons stated, sim-
ply false doctrine.").
102. Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Contracting Out of
Government's Role in Punishment and Federal Preemption of State Law, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 529, 541-42 (1994).
103. See TOm CARBONNEAu, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 224 (1997) ("In a practical and very real sense, unlimited arbi-
trability amounts to the 'deconstruction' of law; it privatizes an entire range of
formerly public juridical responsibilities."); I MACNEIL, SPE1DEL & STI-
PANOWICH, supra note 12, § 3.2.1, at 3:4 ("Carried to extremes, arbitration
1999] 725
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
As Leonard Riskin and James Westbrook put it, an
"obvious tension" exists between the deferential "manifest dis-
regard" standard of review and the Court's statement that ju-
dicial review is "sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply
with" the law.104 This tension has forced lower courts into self-
contradiction. For example, in Montes v. Shearson Lehman
Bros., Inc.,105 the Eleventh Circuit said that "[w]hen a claim
arises under specific laws.., the arbitrators are bound to fol-
low those laws," 06 but in the very next paragraph stated that
"N[t]his does not mean that arbitrators can be reversed for er-
rors or misinterpretations of law."107 In what sense are arbi-
trators "bound" to follow laws if they will not be vacated for
failing to do so?108 Perhaps the Eleventh Circuit left its ordi-
nary realm of legal duties to pontificate on moral duties. More
likely, it just got caught in a contradiction the Supreme Court
created.
When courts confirm arbitration awards that make errors
of law, parties lose the substantive rights that would have been
vindicated by an application of the law. Only in rare cases
does a court vacate an arbitration award because of the arbi-
trator's legal error. 09 Outside these rare cases, an agreement
to arbitrate is, in effect, an agreement to comply with the arbi-
trator's decision whether or not the arbitrator applies the law.
Such an agreement, then, contracts out of all the law that
would have been applied by a court but for the agreement. All
such law, in effect, consists of default rules because arbitration
permits the disputants to contract out of the judicial process and even from
the law of liability and remedy governing litigants in courts."); Carrington &
Haagen, supra note 33, at 338 (arbitration allows parties "to contract out of
effective private enforcement of regulations adverse to their interests");
Schwartz, supra note 61, at 121 (noting that there is a "degree to which even a
facially-neutral arbitration clause works a prospective waiver of substantive
rights").
104. LEONARD R SIKN & JAMES WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND
LAWYERS 564 (2d ed. 1997).
105. 128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997).
106. Id. at 1459.
107. Id. at 1460.
108. "[If arbitrators are to be bound by law, their application of that law
must be subject to review. Without such review, the fetters that bind them
would be loose indeed." Stewart E. Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Ar-
bitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481,
484(1981).
109. See supra notes 85-100 and accompanying text.
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agreements are enforced. Arbitration agreements contract out
of substantive law; they privatize law.
An arbitration clause is, as the Supreme Court recognizes,
a specialized kind of forum-selection clause.110 It is special in
that it chooses a private, not government, forum. An arbitra-
tion clause is also a specialized kind of choice-of-law clause.1
Choice-of-law clauses resemble arbitration clauses. because
they are both pre-dispute agreements alienating substantive
rights. But choice-of-law clauses do not privatize law. The
choice of New York law over Alabama law, or Swiss law over
United States law, is merely the choice of one government's law
over another government's law. In contrast, arbitration
agreements choose privately-created law over all government
law. With choice-of-law clauses, the menu of law includes only
those options governments have created. 112 In contrast, arbi-
tration agreements permit a menu limited only by the parties'
imaginations. The similarity between choice-of-law and arbi-
tration clauses is in what they permit parties to contract out of;
the difference is in what they permit parties to contract into.
I. IMPLICATIONS
A. CLAIMS ARISING UNDER MANDATORY RULES
The conclusion that arbitration agreements contract out of
substantive law compels the Supreme Court to make a choice if
it is to prevent arbitration from effectively converting manda-
tory rules into default rules. The Court must either (1) reverse
its decisions that claims arising under otherwise mandatory
rules are arbitrable, or (2) require de novo judicial review of
arbitrators' legal rulings on such claims. Until the Court
makes one of these choices, the enforcement of arbitration
agreements effectively converts what would otherwise be man-
datory rules of law into default rules. That these rules would
otherwise be mandatory is another way of saying that arbitra-
tion is currently the only way to contract out of these vast ar-
eas of law. It is inconsistent for the law to treat certain rules
110. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
111. See Sterk, supra note 108, at 491.
112. This is better than no menu at all. See, e.g., Larry Ribstein, Choosing
Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 250 (1993) ("Permitting contracting par-
ties to choose their governing law gives states an incentive to compete for law
business by providing efficient legal rules.").
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as mandatory in all contexts except arbitration.113 As long as
legislatures constitutionally enact mandatory legal rules,
agreements to arbitrate claims under these statutes should be
unenforceable, or there should be de novo judicial review of ar-
bitrators' legal rulings on such claims. The same conclusion
applies to mandatory rules of common law.114
This conclusion is subject to an important limitation, how-
ever. It applies only to pre-dispute arbitration agreements and
awards rendered in arbitration pursuant to them. It does not
apply to post-dispute arbitration agreements or awards ren-
dered in arbitration pursuant to them. Post-dispute arbitra-
tion agreements are like post-dispute settlement agreements.
A post-dispute agreement to arbitrate a claim arising out of a
113. Some legal rules are treated as mandatory in all contexts except arbi-
tration and choice-of-law clauses. Just as the law allows parties to contract
out of otherwise mandatory rules through arbitration clauses, it allows parties
to contract out of otherwise mandatory rules through choice-of-law clauses.
See Michael J. Whincop & Mary E. Keyes, Statutes' Domains in Private Inter-
national Law: An Economic Theory of the Limits of Mandatory Rules, 20
SYDNEY L. REV. 435, 437 (contrasting "rule default" with "choice of law de-
fault"). Larry Ribstein supports courts' practice of "enforc[ing] choice-of-law
clauses even in situations in which they would refuse to enforce direct evasion
of the mandatory rule." Ribstein, supra note 112, at 255-56; see also Bruce
Kobayashi & Larry Ribstein, Federalism, Efficiency and Competition 34 (Nov.
16, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Minnesota Law Review).
Ribstein's primary reason is that the "use of choice-of-law clauses to avoid
mandatory rules is constrained by the fact that avoidance requires applying a
state law rather than solely the voluntary act of contracting parties. In other
words, the parties cannot enter into a contract that is condemned by all juris-
dictions." Ribstein, supra, at 255-56. This reason emphatically does not apply
to arbitration clauses.
114. This conclusion applies to international, as well as domestic, arbitra-
tion. But it leads to different results because courts treat some rules that are
mandatory in the domestic context as default in the international context.
Consider, for example, the Securities Act, with its non-waiver provision ex-
pressly stating that the Act consists of mandatory rules, see supra note 61.
Despite that provision, most courts allow parties to contract out of the Securi-
ties Act with clauses providing that, for example, English law, rather than
United States law, shall govern. See Haynsworth v. The Corporation, 121
F.3d 956, 965-69 (5th Cir. 1997); Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d 923, 928-
30 (4th Cir. 1996); Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 160-62 (7th Cir.
1993); Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1361-66 (2d Cir. 1993).
But see Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 107 F.3d 1422, 1426-28 (9th Cir.)
(stating that the clauses were unenforceable), opinion withdrawn and super-
seded on reh'g, 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 365(1998). On arbitrability in international arbitration, see, for example, William
W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural
Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 647, 699-705 (1989);
William W. Park, Private Adjudicators and the Public Interest: The Expanding
Scope of International Arbitration, 12 BROOK. J. INTL L. 629, 664-71 (1986).
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mandatory rule is like a post-dispute agreement to settle a
claim arising out of a mandatory rule. Such settlement agree-
ments are, of course, routinely enforced. 115 In other words,
even rights arising out of mandatory rules are alienable, post-
dispute.116 So post-dispute agreements to arbitrate do not im-
plicate the distinction between mandatory and default rules
and they should be enforced regardless of whether they cover
mandatory law.1 7 Similarly, awards rendered in arbitration
pursuant to them should not be reviewed for errors of law
anymore than courts review settlement agreements for "errors
of law." It is only pre-dispute arbitration agreements that im-
plicate the distinction between mandatory and default rules.
To reiterate, there are two options to prevent arbitration,
pursuant to pre-dispute agreements, from effectively convert-
ing mandatory rules into default rules. These options are
inarbitrability and de novo judicial review. These will be dis-
cussed in turn.
1. Inarbitrability
a. Consistency with the FAA
The inarbitrability of claims arising under mandatory law
is consistent with the statutes and common law doctrines im-
posing mandatory law, but is it consistent with the FAA? The
entire FAA embodies a strongly contractual approach to arbi-
tration law."8 The contractual approach is especially reflected
in section 2 of the FAA. It requires courts to enforce arbitra-
tion agreements "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."119 Such grounds
clearly include "generally applicable contract defenses, such as
115. See MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note 12, at 275 ("The law gov-
erning the enforcement and effect of settlement agreements is for the most
part ordinary contract law.").
116. See Judith A. McMorrow, Who Owns Rights: Waiving and Settling
Private Rights ofAction, 34 VILL. L. REV. 429, 463-65 (1989). All rights, inso-
far as they are vindicated through private rights of action, are alienable post-
dispute. The rights-holder can simply refrain from suing until the limitations
period expires. See id.
117. There is no ground for making rights less alienable through arbitra-
tion than through other means.
118. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doc-
tor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1001, 1002-06
(1996).
119. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
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fraud, duress or unconscionability. 120 Such grounds do not in-
clude grounds applicable only to arbitration agreements, how-
ever; any law singling out arbitration agreements by making
them less enforceable than other contracts conflicts with sec-
tion 2 of the FAA.121 As the Supreme Court put it, a ground
"that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract
to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with" the FAA.122
For this reason, the Court has repeatedly held that the
FAA preempts state law that renders some or all types of
claims inarbitrable. 123 These holdings are correct with regard
to state laws that do nothing other than preclude enforcement
of agreements to arbitrate certain claims. 124 These laws pro-
vide a ground for the revocation of an arbitration agreement
that is not a ground for the revocation of "any contract."
But the ground for inarbitrability of a given claim is not
always so specific as a statute expressly precluding enforce-
ment of agreements to arbitrate that type of claim. Grounds
for inarbitrability of a type of claim can be cast in more general
terms, as well. For instance, prior to the Supreme Court's ex-
pansion of arbitrability, courts held various types of claims
inarbitrable on the ground of "public policy."125 One might ar-
gue that this ground is consistent with the FAA because courts
rely on "public policy" as a ground for denying enforcement to
many contracts unrelated to arbitration, such as agreements
not to marry or non-competition agreements between employee
and employer.2 6 "Public policy" is not a ground singling out
arbitration agreements. But if courts were to hold that no
claims are arbitrable on the ground that enforcement of any
120. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686 (1996).
12L See Ware, supra note 118, at 1012.
122. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 685.
123. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282 (1995)(preempting an Alabama state law denying enforcement to all pre-dispute ar-
bitration agreements); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1987)(preempting state law denying enforcement of agreements to arbitrate Cali-
fornia Labor Code claims); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984)(preempting state law denying enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate Cali-
fornia Franchise Investment Law claims). See generally Ware, supra note
118, at 1035 & n.72 (discussing arbitration and the relationship between fed-
eral and state law). I have argued that parties can contract out of FAA pre-
emption of state law but that typical choice-of-law clauses do not do that. See
Ware, supra note 102, at 551-58.
124. See Ware, supra note 118, at 1012.
125. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
126. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 21, §§ 5.1-5.9.
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arbitration agreement violates public policy, they would be in
direct conflict with the FAA. It would similarly conflict with
the FAA if courts held that no claims are arbitrable because
every arbitration agreement is unconscionable, even though
unconscionability is a ground permitted by the FAA. So the
"ground" for inarbitrability must be judged on its substance,
not merely its label. The level of specificity with which one
chooses to characterize a ground cannot be determinative of
whether it conflicts with the FAA. In short, determining
whether particular inarbitrability law conflicts with the FAA
can be a complex and murky endeavor.
For the sake of simplicity and clarity, courts might well
conclude that mandatory legal rules do not conflict with the
FAA even though, when properly interpreted, they render
claims arising under them inarbitrable. The reasoning would
be that mandatory rules do not single out arbitration agree-
ments; rather, they void all pre-dispute contracts purporting to
alienate the pertinent substantive rights.127
b. Practical Concerns
The practical concerns generated by inarbitrability are
fairly well known because, until quite recently, many claims
were inarbitrable.12 8 Courts have experience dealing with
inarbitrability, although not with the mandatory/default dis-
tinction as the criteria for determining arbitrability. The arbi-
trability issue arises at the threshold of adjudication, when a
lawsuit is met with a motion to stay pending arbitration or
when a party moves to compel its adversary to arbitrate. The
party seeking to litigate, rather than arbitrate, argues that one
or more claims is inarbitrable. The court then analyzes, on a
claim-by-claim basis, whether the claims are arbitrable. With
respect to arbitrable claims, the court grants the motion to stay
litigation or compel arbitration; with respect to inarbitrable
claims, the court denies the motion. Arbitration of arbitrable
claims proceeds even though litigation of inarbitrable claims is
127. This reasoning is not beyond criticism. If the test is whether law
"singles out" arbitration, does that mean law becomes consistent with the
FAA by "doubling out" arbitration, i.e., precluding enforcement of arbitration
agreements as just one other type of contract? If so, the FAA can be evaded
just by finding some obscure, trivial type of contract and making it, along with
arbitration agreements, unenforceable.
128. See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
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also proceeding.129 This duplication is the only major practical
concern generated by inarbitrability.
This description of inarbitrability in practice was routine
prior to the Supreme Court's decisions expanding arbitrability.
Future inarbitrability should be similar, except that the basis
for determining which claims are arbitrable should be whether
the claim arises under a mandatory or default rule.
c. Clarifying the Basis for Inarbitrability
While some scholars have argued that the class of inarbi-
trable claims should be statutory claims, 130 the proper arbitra-
bility distinction is mandatory/default, not statutory/common
law. 31 To the extent statutory law consists of default rules,
129. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985). See gen-
erally II MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 12, § 16.2.2, at 16:20-
16:23 (discussing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd and the intertwining of
arbitrable and inarbitrable claims).
130. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court:
A Plea for Statutory Reform, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 231, 273 (1990)(proposing amendment to FAA and arguing that "[clases involving the en-
forcement of fundamental statutory rights cannot be the subject of an arbitra-
tion agreement or of an arbitral proceeding"); Schwartz, supra note 61, at 125-
27 (proposing to not "enforce adhesive arbitration clauses for non-contract
claims" and to "create a presumption against compelled arbitration of statu-
tory claims"); Richard E. Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory Rights Under the
Federal Arbitration Act: The Case for Reform, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
157, 206 (1989) ("R[]nike commercial arbitration, where the limitations of ar-
bitration may be strengths, statutory rights pose issues of public law which
require a vindication that arbitration may be unable consistently to provide.");
see also CARBONNEAU, supra note 103, at 117-257 (chapter discussing arbitra-
tion and statutory rights).
A distinction between federal and state law is plausible given the concern,
discussed above, that making any type of claim inarbitrable is in some tension
with the FAA. One might argue that, given this tension, the FAA preempts
state inarbitrability law by virtue of the Constitution's Supremacy Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2., but that the FAA does not overcome federal inarbi-
trability law. Federal inarbitrability law survives its tension with the FAA
under the ordinary principles by which courts reconcile conflicts between two
statutes. This is because "a more specific statute will be given precedence
over a more general one, regardless of their temporal sequence." Busic v.
United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980); accord Edmond v. United States, 117
S.Ct. 1573, 1578 (1997) ("Ordinarily, where a specific provision conflicts with
a general one, the specific governs."). So a distinction between federal and
state law is plausible but its persuasiveness depends on the degree of tension
one sees between inarbitrability and the FAA.
131. The mandatory/default distinction can be profitably compared with
the arbitrability distinction advocated by Edward M. Morgan, Contract Theory
and the Sources of Rights: An Approach to the Arbitrability Question, 60 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1059, 1082 (1987) (advocating a "distinction between those rights
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claims under statutory law should be arbitrable because there
is nothing countervailing freedom of contract and the FAA's
endorsement of it. There is nothing inherent in the nature of a
statutory right preventing it from being alienable, pre-dispute.
Conversely, to the extent that common law consists of manda-
tory rules, claims under common law should be inarbitrable.
The rationale for inarbitrability is that arbitration agreements,
in effect, contract out of substantive law. Mandatory common
law rules deserve no less deference than mandatory statutory
rules.
d. Contractually Reinstating Arbitrability
The rationale for inarbitrability of claims arising under
mandatory law is that arbitrators often do not apply the law.
Such claims should become arbitrable if the arbitration agree-
ment requires, as some do,132 the arbitrator to apply the law.
When an award issued pursuant to such an agreement is
challenged in court, the court should enforce the agreement by
confirming the award only if the arbitrator applied the law.
That is, the court should engage in de novo review of the arbi-
trator's legal, as opposed to factual, rulings. 33 Some courts
which flow naturally from one person's interaction with another and those
which are imposed by the state in furtherance of the collective interest").
While these two approaches might now reach similar conclusions about what
claims are arbitrable, Morgan's approach rests on Kantian philosophy, while
the mandatory/default distinction is descriptive and positivist so its conclu-
sions will change as positive law changes. The mandatory/default distinction
also avoids the flaw of the old "public policy" approach in which courts in-
vaded the province of the legislature by deciding which statutes are arbitra-
ble. See Stempel, supra note 12, at 283-335.
132. "A growing number of companies want their arbitrators to 'apply the
law' to reward the company's effort to follow the law strictly in business
transactions. These firms seek to reduce the risk of an arbitrator deciding the
case 'equitably' or arbitrarily." BRUNET & CRAVER, supra note 85, at 427; see
also Edward Brunet & Walter E. Stem, Drafting the Effective ADR Clause for
Natural Resources and Energy Contracts, 11 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 7
(1996).
Whether a particular agreement requires the arbitrator to apply the law
is, like any question of contract interpretation, case-specific. It is unlikely
though, that an agreement containing an ordinary choice-of-law clause, e.g.,
"this contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York," should
be interpreted to require arbitrators to apply the law. To be so interpreted, a
clause should explicitly state that it is a directive to the arbitrator, rather
than to a court.
133. The law/fact distinction, like the substance/procedure distinction, is
useful although it is not absolute. Judicial review would have to extend to ar-
bitrators' factual rulings to the extent necessary to prevent a dishonest arbi-
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support this approach;134 others do not.135 This approach, of
allowing parties to opt in to de novo judicial review, comports
with the contractual nature of arbitration. 136 Furthermore, it
trator from making incorrect factual findings that compel the arbitrators' de-
sired legal rulings.
134. See Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888-90 (9th
Cir. 1997); Syncor Intl Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 WL 452245, at
*6-7 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (unpublished) (per curiam); Gateway Techs., Inc.
v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1995); Tretina Print-
ing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., 640 A.2d 788, 793 (N.J. 1994) (per curiam);
Fils et Cables d'Acier de Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240, 244
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
135. See Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 909 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Cal.
1995), rev'd, 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997); cf. Western Employers Ins. Co. v.
Jefferies & Co., 958 F.2d 258, 261 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[Clourts will not heighten
their otherwise deferential review of arbitral awards even where the arbitra-
tors misapplied the law .... The fact that a court has access to detailed find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law does not alter this deferential review.");
Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d
1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991) ("If the parties want, they can contract for an ap-
pellate arbitration panel to review the arbitrator's award. But they cannot
contract for judicial review of that award; federal jurisdiction cannot be cre-
ated by contract."); Tom Cullinan, Note, Contracting for an Expanded Scope of
Judicial Review in Arbitration Agreements, 51 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1998). In
neither Western Employers nor Chicago Typographical did the arbitration
agreement require the arbitrator to apply the law, so these two cases are
hardly on point. For a criticism of Chicago Typographical, see BRUNET &
CRAVER, supra note 85, at 436-37.
136. See Ware, supra note 102, at 542 n.50 ("[P]arties to such an agree-
ment have contractually reinstated their substantive rights, which otherwise
would have been contractually waived by agreeing to arbitrate."); Cullinan,
supra note 135, at 421-22 ("[The grounds for vacatur enumerated in the FAA
actually are codified forms of contractual interpretation. They serve only to
aid the court in determining exactly for what the parties contracted, by repre-
senting implicit limitations on the contractual obligation.").
Kenneth Davis argues that parties to arbitration agreements should be
able to choose among varying levels of judicial review. See Kenneth R. Davis,
When Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 123-32 (1997). Similarly, I argue here that con-
tracts for de novo judicial review of legal questions should be enforced. The
difference is in how we treat parties who do not opt for de novo judicial re-
view. Davis argues, on freedom of contract grounds, that agreements by such
parties to arbitrate any and all claims should be enforced. See id. That is, he
would permit arbitration agreements to privatize vast areas of law. However
appealing that is as a normative matter, it cannot be reconciled with a legal
system permeated by mandatory rules. It is inconsistent to enforce pre-
dispute agreements contracting out of a law through arbitration but not en-
force other pre-dispute agreements contracting out of the same law. See su-
pra note 113 and accompanying text. My own desire to see virtually all claims
arbitrable, see Ware, supra note 19, at 101-02, follows from a view that there
should be little mandatory law.
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does not extend a court beyond its proper bounds. As Judge
Alex Kozinski stated:
In general, I do not believe parties may impose on the federal
courts burdens and functions that Congress has withheld. A partial
answer is that any case properly in district court under the Federal
Arbitration Act must have an independent jurisdictional basis ....
Thus, enforcing the arbitration agreement--even with enhanced judi-
cial review-will consume far fewer judicial resources than if the case
were given plenary adjudication. The rub is that the work the dis-
trict court must perform under this arbitration clause is not a subset
of what it would be doing if the case were brought directly under di-
versity or federal question jurisdiction. It's not just less work, it is
different work Nowhere has Congress authorized courts to review
arbitral awards under the standard the parties here adopted.
Nevertheless, I conclude that we must enforce the arbitration
agreement according to its terms. The review to which the parties
have agreed is no different from that performed by the district courts
in appeals from administrative agencies and bankruptcy courts, or on
habeas corpus. I would call the case differently if the agreement pro-
vided that the district judge would review the award by flipping a
coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl. Given the strong policy
of party empowerment embodied in the Arbitration Act, I see no rea-
son why Congress would object to enforcement of this agreement.
This is not quite an express congressional authorization but, given
the Arbitration Act's policy, it's probably enough. 137
A practical concern about agreements requiring the arbi-
trator to apply the law is that de novo judicial review would
necessitate two things often absent from arbitration: (1) a writ-
ten opinion by the arbitrator reflecting the reasoning behind
the award, and (2) a transcript or other record of the arbitra-
tion hearing. 138 This objection is stronger with regard to a rec-
ord than to an opinion. Arbitrator opinions are not essential to
judicial review of arbitrators' legal rulings. Jurors do not write
opinions, yet judges overturn jury verdicts (JNOV) for failure
137. Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997)
(Kozinski, J., concurring). Judge Kozinski's reasoning is phrased in terms of
federal courts, but it applies equally to state courts.
138. See I MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 12, § 7.40.2, at
7:70-7:73; see also RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND
EXPERIMENT IN EMPLOYMENT 134 (1997) ("A reviewing court cannot ascertain
whether the arbitrator correctly followed the law unless the arbitrator states
the law in writing and applies it to the facts of the case. Written opinions are
critical to any meaningful judicial review of the substantive matters at issue
in a case."); GOLDBERG, SANDER & ROGERS, supra note 38, at 217 ("[Without a
written opinion] it may be difficult for the reviewing court to know whether
the arbitrator has complied with the requirements of the statute at issue....
[Tihe Supreme Court [should] insist on written opinions as a condition to
sending statutory claims to arbitration.").
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to apply the law.139 Admittedly, trial judges have observed the
trial, while courts reviewing arbitration awards have not ob-
served the arbitration hearing. But appellate courts can and
do reverse trial judges' denials of JNOV even though the ap-
pellate court has not observed the trial.140 Moreover, trial courtjudges do not always write opinions supporting their rulings,
yet appellate courts overturn them for failure to apply the
law.141 In sum, adjudicators who do not write reasoned opin-
ions get reversed by those who did not observe the proceedings
below. Arbitrators who do not write reasoned opinions can be
similarly reversed. In contrast, a record of the proceedings
below is essential to a reviewing court. A trial nearly always
produces a written record including a transcript, while arbitra-
tion typically does not. It is virtually impossible for a court to
review whether arbitrators applied the law unless the court
has some record of the testimony and other evidence submitted
to the arbitrator.142 How much of a record is necessary will in-
evitably be determined case-by-case.43
139. See FRIEDENTHALETAL., supra note 13, § 12.3, at 543-56.
140. See, e.g., Neely v. Martin KL Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317 (1967);
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 (1940).
141. See, e.g., Glass v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 34 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 1994)(reversing judgment based on evidentiary ruling for which district court did
not set forth reasons); Spiegel v. Trustees of Tufts College, 843 F.2d 38 (1st
Cir. 1988) (overturning grant of Rule 54(b) certification; district court did not
set forth reasons for its order).
142. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 440 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez
de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (Frankfrter, J.,
dissenting) (to ensure that arbitrators do not disregard the law, "appropriate
means for judicial scrutiny must be implied, in the form of some record or
opinion, however informal, whereby such compliance [with the law] will ap-
pear, or want of it will upset the award").
143. Arbitration rules typically allow a party to hire a stenographer or
other means of transcribing the arbitration hearing. If both parties choose
not to do so, they waive their opportunity to create a record of testimony. A
party challenging an award arising out of such an arbitration has only itself to
blame for deficiencies in the record available to a reviewing court. If no tran-
script is prepared in litigation, the trial court's judgment is unlikely to be re-
versed on appeal. See 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 507 (1993) ("Where a
stenographic transcript or a substitute therefor is required to raise an issue
on appeal and such transcript or substitute is not prepared, the appeal should
be dismissed, or the decision should be affirmed, and a party need not be
given a second opportunity to create a record.") (footnotes omitted). A court's
review of an arbitration award in the absence of a transcript is analogous. So
the question should not be whether there is a thorough record of the arbitra-
tion hearing but, if there is no such record, whether the party opposing en-
forcement of the award could have ensured an adequate record.
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2. De Novo Judicial Review
a. Consistency with the FAA
The alternative to making claims arising under mandatory
rules inarbitrable (except where the agreement requires the
arbitrator to apply the law) is to keep such claims arbitrable
but to impose de novo judicial review regardless of whether the
agreement calls for it. Imposing de novo judicial review, as op-
posed to allowing parties to contract into it by requiring the
arbitrator to apply the law, may be difficult to reconcile with
the FAA. Even the current "manifest disregard" standard is
arguably difficult to reconcile with the FAA. As Tom Carbon-
neau argues, "[the review of awards on the merits is not con-
templated under Section Ten of the FAA; in fact, such a prac-
tice contradicts the gravamen of the legislation and the judicial
policy that sprang from it."144 Other scholars and courts
agree.145 In contrast, Edward Brunet and Charles Craver em-
phasize that FAA section 10(a)(3) uses the word "rights" in
authorizing courts to vacate awards. 46 "The presence of this
word in the FAA... must mean that the drafters intended that
courts should have some ability to set aside awards because of
denials of 'rights." 147 An alternative argument is that FAA
section 10(a)(4) authorizes courts to vacate awards where the
arbitrators exceeded their powers and arbitrators do not have
the power to decide disputes without applying mandatory
law. 48 In short, there is substantial debate about the extent to
144. CARBONNEAU, supra note 103, at 260.
145. See GOLDBERG, SANDER & ROGERS, supra note 38, at 217 (under a
more exacting standard of review than manifest disregard, "the policies un-
derlying [the FAA] will suffer to some extent"); Hayford, supra note 94, at 814("Any application of the 'manifest disregard' of the law standard that permits
a reviewing court to delve into the merits of the arbitrator's award is not le-
gitimate."); see also International Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad
Anonima Petrolera, Industrial y Comercial, 745 F. Supp. 172, 178 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) ("The whole point of arbitration is that the merits of the disputes will
not be reviewed in the courts ....").
146. Courts may vacate arbitrators' awards "[wjhere the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the contro-
versy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced." Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (1994) (emphasis
added).
147. BRUNET & CRAVER, supra note 85, at 411-12.
148. Stephen Hayford argues that "[a]ttempts to seek vacatur based on a
claim that the arbitrator committed an error of law are not proper under the
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which the FAA requires and permits courts to review arbitra-
tors' legal rulings.
b. Clarifying the Basis for De Novo Review
Many scholars argue for increased judicial review of arbi-
trators' legal rulings generally, or with respect to some types of
claims, such as statutory claims.1 49
'exceeded powers' clause of section 10(a)(4)." Stephen L. Hayford, A New
Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship Between
Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 443, 456 (1998). This is because of the correct "judicial belief that the
arbitrator's 'powers' referred to in... section 10(a)(4) are contractual in na-
ture." Id. at 455. While the arbitrator's powers derive from the parties' con-
tract, the parties lack the power to contract out of a mandatory law prior to a
dispute. Even if the parties can delegate all their power to the arbitrator,
they should not be able to delegate more power than they have. Nemo dat qui
non habet (He who hath not cannot give). Compare id. at 455-60 with IV
MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 12, § 40.5.1.3, at 40:37-40:40.
149. See GOLDBERG, SANDER & ROGERS, supra note 38, at 216 (predicting
that the Supreme Court "will ultimately adopt a meaningful review standard,
something more than the 'manifest disregard' standard... [because manifest
disregard] ... provides insufficient protection for statutory rights created by
Congress"); IV MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 12, § 40.7.2.5,
at 40:94 ("Current manifest disregard doctrine confers arbitrary powers on
arbitrators that should not be tolerated in a society based on the rule of law.");
John R. Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for
Enhanced Accommodation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C. L. REV. 219,
271-74 (1986); Robert N. Covington, Employment Arbitration After Gilmer:
Have Labor Courts Come to the United States?, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
345, 410 (1998) ("Whenever an award infringes the protections provided by
public law to those who are not parties, due regard for the public decisions
made by the Congress requires that a reviewing court see to it that the inter-
pretations of public law reached by the arbitrator are not merely debatable
but are, in the court's judgment, correct."); Samuel Estreicher, Predispute
Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1344, 1350-51 n.22 (1997) ("Framed for contractual disputes, the 'manifest
disregard' standard may be too deferential for arbitration of public law
claims."); Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Ju-
risprudential Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the
Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1230 (1993) ("[Clourts
should subject employment arbitrators' interpretations of statutes to de novo
review."); John F.X. Peloso & Stuart M. Sarnoff, A Discussion of Whether Ar-
bitrators Have a Duty to Apply the Law, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 18, 1996, at 1, 3("Where there are securities law claims, there are compelling reasons for the
arbitrators to make an effort to understand and apply substantive law. Per-
haps the time is ripe to define that obligation more clearly and develop stan-
dards for review that make such a duty more meaningful."); Speidel, supra
note 130, at 157 ("[CIourts should have clear authority, when statutory claims
are involved, to vacate or modify an arbitrator's award where arbitral proce-
dures denied an adequate hearing or where the arbitrator made a [sic] error
of law."); Stempel, supra note 12, at 283-335 (concluding that instead of inar-
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These arguments fail to respect the distinction between
mandatory and default rules. Unless the agreement calls for
it, arbitration of claims arising under default rules should not
be subject to judicial review for errors of law. A pre-dispute
agreement simply to contract away these claims would have
been enforceable, 150 so there is no reason to refuse enforcement
of a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate them. Such an agree-
ment alienates the rights specified by the default rule, just as
would contracting around the rule, and substitutes whatever
rights the arbitrator chooses. 51 Enforcing these new privately-
created rights is no different than enforcing any rights created
by contract. Imposing judicial review of arbitrators' legal rul-
ings goes beyond contract law in adding an extra barrier to en-
forcement of arbitration agreements. This would, with respect
to claims arising under default rules, contravene freedom of
contract, and the FAA's endorsement of it, without any ground
for doing so. With respect to claims arising under mandatory
rules, imposing judicial review would also contravene freedom
of contract but with a solid ground for doing so. The essence of
a mandatory rule is that it trumps freedom of contract.1 52 Ac-
cordingly, courts should review arbitrators' legal rulings on
claims arising out of mandatory rules, but not on claims aris-
ing out of default rules.1 53
bitrability, a "[c ourt might preferably, for example, make more aggressive use
of the 'manifest disregard of law' rationale for vacating arbitration awards
that do not resolve disputes in accordance with statutory goals"); Jean R.
Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Pref-
erence for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 711 (1996) ("Although
courts should refuse to conduct de novo review on many arbitration decisions,
they should not be reluctant to set aside arbitral awards that are clearly un-
founded and inconsistent with applicable law."); Ronald Turner, Compulsory
Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims with Special Reference to
the Three As-Access, Adjudication, and Acceptability, 31 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 231, 293 (1996); U.S. DEPTS OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, COMMISSION ON
THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, REPORT AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS 31-33 (1994).
150. This is precisely what makes such rules default rules. See supra
notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
151. See Ware, supra note 102, at 542 n.50. ("In agreeing to arbitrate, par-
ties trade their substantive rights for the arbitrator's decision as constrained
by the agreement and the limited judicial review of arbitral awards.").
152. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
153. Cf. MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note 12, at 637-38:
Of course, in thinking about judicial review [of arbitration] on mat-
ters of 'law' we should distinguish between mere rules of construc-
tion, which come into play in the absence of a contrary agreement,
and mandatory rules.... Where the parties have bargained for dis-
1999]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
c. Practical Concerns
One practical concern about this approach is that courts
would have trouble controlling their understandable desire to
do justice. Once the barndoor is open, so to speak, to review
some of an arbitrator's legal rulings, will a court be tempted to
review all the legal rulings in that case, even though the court
should confine itself to rulings on claims arising under manda-
tory rules?1 54 This concern is heightened by the timing of judi-
cial review after arbitration, in contrast to the arbitrability de-
cision made before arbitration. A court making an arbitrability
decision prior to arbitration might be worried about whether
the arbitrators might do an injustice. But that worry seems
less likely to motivate a court than a completed arbitration
award in which the arbitrators actually did injustice.
Another practical concern arises from the fact that arbitra-
tion pleadings often do not identify discrete causes of action.
There may be nothing resembling what is standard in litiga-
tion-a complaint with discrete counts alleging discrete legal
claims. Arbitration pleadings are often so informal that there
is ambiguity about what claims are asserted or even if the con-
cept of "claims" applies. Thus, parties who lose at arbitration
may move to vacate the award on the ground that the arbitra-
tor did not apply mandatory law when there is much doubt
about whether claims arising under mandatory law were even
asserted in arbitration.
To counter this, courts may need to require parties to an-
nounce at the outset of arbitration whether they are asserting
any claims arising under mandatory law. This would alert
other parties to the risk of a motion to vacate for failure to ap-
ply the law and to the need for a record of the arbitration pro-
ceedings. 155 Requiring arbitration pleadings to announce
whether they assert claims arising under mandatory law would
partially judicialize" arbitration procedure, adding legalistic
formalities that may make the process less attractive to many
pute resolution through arbitration, the method they have chosen to
fill any gaps in the agreement is the arbitrator's interpretation. His
interpretation is their bargain. In contrast, legal 'rules' in other ar-
eas may reflect stronger and overriding governmental or societal in-
terests.
154. See Hayford, supra note 94, at 833 ("Many members of the federal ju-
diciary are simply unwilling to foreclose all possibility of overturning commer-
cial arbitration awards they perceive to be grossly in error. These judges are
in the business of ensuring that justice prevails.").
155. See supra notes 85-87, 138-43 and accompanying text.
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parties. Requiring arbitration pleadings to announce whether
they assert claims arising under mandatory law would also
contravene the freedom to contract for the procedures of arbi-
tration. Thus it should be imposed only to the extent needed to
ensure that parties who, post-dispute, demand an application
of mandatory law receive that application. Accordingly, parties
who do not announce at the outset of arbitration that claims
under mandatory law are being asserted should be precluded
from seeking judicial review of the arbitrators' legal rulings.
They have waived such review.
3. An Assessment and a Prediction
To prevent parties from effectively contracting out of oth-
erwise mandatory law, the Supreme Court must either (1) re-
verse its decisions that claims arising under otherwise manda-
tory rules are arbitrable or (2) require de novo judicial review
of arbitrators' legal rulings on such claims. The above com-
parison of inarbitrability and judicial review does not yield a
clear winner between these choices. The essential practical
choice between inarbitrability and de novo judicial review is
where to add the extra layer of procedure. Inarbitrability adds
the extra layer at the start of adjudication while de novo judi-
cial review adds it at the end. Wherever the extra layer of pro-
cedure is added, it will consume extra time and money.156
On balance, inarbitrability seems to be in less tension with
the FAA and subject to less troubling practical problems.157 So
inarbitrability is probably a better way to deal with mandatory
law in arbitration. Inarbitrability, however, seems unlikely to
be revived by the Supreme Court. The Court has so steadily
expanded arbitrability in a number of decisions over the last
twenty-five years158 that stare decisis and institutional con-
156. Even under judicial review of arbitrators' legal rulings, "many claims
that are sent to arbitration will not return for judicial review, as both parties
will be satisfied with the arbitrator's decision." GOLDBERG, SANDER &
ROGERS, supra note 38, at 217. A similar point can be made about inarbitra-
bility. Even if claims under mandatory law are inarbitrable, many of them
will still go to arbitration because neither party insists on litigating rather
than arbitrating. In effect, the parties make a post-dispute agreement to ar-
bitrate all claims, mandatory and default.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 118-143.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
1999]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
cerns make it highly unlikely the Court will reverse direction
so sharply.159
In contrast, the Court has devoted little attention to the
standard by which courts review arbitrators' legal rulings. The
"manifest disregard" standard originated in casual dicta from
the Court's 1953 opinion in Wilko v. Swan.160
This dictum has been revisited by the Supreme Court but three
times in the forty-three years since Wilko: once in Justice Stevens's
dissent in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.; a
second time in Justice Blackmun's partially concurring/partially dis-
senting opinion in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon;
and a third time in a parenthetical phrase in dictum in a 1995 case,
First Options, Inc. v. Kaplan. Beyond the Wilko dictum, the Court
has at no time elucidated further as to the meaning and effect it at-
tributes to the "manifest disregard" of the law standard.61
The Court can thus write on a nearly clean slate in addressing
standards ofjudicial review. It seems more likely then that the
Court will tighten, or permit lower courts to tighten, judicial
review of arbitrators' legal rulings, rather than revive inarbi-
trability.
Tightening judicial review can occur gradually in two
ways. One way would be to hold that the current "manifest
disregard" standard applies to most claims but that certain
claims warrant a more exacting standard. This latter category
of claims would expand slowly, case-by-case: first employment
discrimination, then securities fraud, and so on. The second
way gradually to tighten judicial review would be to treat all
claims equally but subject them to incrementally more exacting
review over time. This process might be imperceptible in the
short run because courts would not announce any change in
doctrine. They would just be a bit more critical of arbitration
awards. Only in the long run would statistics show a higher
percentage of arbitration awards vacated for "manifest disre-
gard."16 2
Both forms of gradualism appear to be underway in the
D.C. Circuit case of Cole v. Burns International Security Serv-
159. There are cases holding Title VII claims inarbitrable but they rely on
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which is irrelevant to the arbitrability of other
claims. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
160. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
161. Hayford, supra note 94, at 811.
162. Statistics might never show this if arbitrators learn of tightening ju-
dicial review and respond to it by focusing more on applying the law.
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ices.163 Cole held that agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims
are enforceable "only if judicial review under the 'manifest dis-
regard of the law' standard is sufficiently rigorous to ensure
that arbitrators have properly interpreted and applied statu-
tory law."164 The opinion went on to assert that "the courts are
empowered to review an arbitrator's award to ensure that its
resolution of public law issues is correct."165 Cole, in essence,
converts the "manifest disregard" standard into a de novo
"error of law" standard, at least with respect to claims under
statutory or public law.166 So Cole exhibits gradualism in con-
fining itself to statutory or public law claims, perhaps even to
Title VII.167 And Cole announces no overt doctrinal challenge
to manifest disregard. It subtly 68 indicates that courts should
tighten their review of arbitration awards.169
163. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Judge Harry Edwards authored this
opinion and has written several law review articles on arbitration. See, e.g.,
Harry T. Edwards, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Clash
Between the Public Policy Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 3 (1988); Edwards, supra note 12.
164. 105 F.3d at 1487.
165. Id.
166. Judge Edwards enacted into law views he had previously espoused in
a law review:
In strictly private disputes, ADR mechanisms such as arbitration of-
ten are superior to adjudication....
However, if ADR is extended to resolve difficult issues of consti-
tutional or public law-making use of nonlegal values to resolve im-
portant social issues or allowing those the law seeks to regulate to
delimit public rights and duties-there is real reason for concern. An
oft-forgotten virtue of adjudication is that it ensures the proper
resolution and application of public values.
Edwards, supra note 12, at 676. "So long as we restrict arbitrators to the ap-
plication of clearly defined rules of law, and strictly confine the articulation of
public law to our courts, ADR can be an effective means of reducing mush-
rooming caseloads." Id. at 680.
167. Cole aggravates the worry, discussed above, that courts will miss the
distinction between mandatory and default rules. Rather than using the
mandatory/default distinction, Cole apparently uses either the statu-
tory/common law distinction or the public law/private law distinction.
168. Tom Carbonneau suggests that, in Cole "[t]he court appears torn be-
tween its desire to invalidate an obviously unfair [arbitration] agreement and
its obligation to follow Supreme Court precedent on the validity of arbitration
agreements." CARBONNEAU, supra note 103, at 26 (Supp. 1998).
169. Cole's message was recently picked up by the Second Circuit. See
Halligan v. Piper Jaffiray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998) (vacating, for
manifest disregard of law, award for employer in discrimination case). Halli-
gan's application of "manifest disregard" seems far less deferential to the arbi-
trator than the Second Circuit's 1986 application of it in Bobker. See supra
note 96.
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While gradualism in the law has its virtues, it risks a lack
of clarity and consistency. It would be better for the Supreme
Court to announce bright lines: de novo judicial review of arbi-
trators' rulings on mandatory law, and zero judicial review of
arbitrators' rulings on default law. It would probably be better
yet for the Supreme Court to announce the bright line of inar-
bitrable mandatory law and zero judicial review of arbitrators'
legal rulings-unless parties contractually require the arbitra-
tor to apply the law, in which case there is universal arbitra-
bility and de novo review.
B. CLAIMS ARISING UNDER DEFAULT RULES
1. Better Gap-Fillers
The first section of Part III discussed implications for arbi-
tration of claims arising out of mandatory rules. This section
discusses the arbitration of claims arising out of default rules.
Law consisting of default rules may, by definition, be pri-
vatized.170 This process of privatization occurs with every en-
forceable contract. The parties substitute privately-created
rights and duties for whatever government-created rights and
duties are specified by the default rule. How, then, does an ar-
bitration agreement privatize law differently from any other
contract?
An answer rests on the incomplete nature of contracts.
Parties forming a contract cannot foresee all possible contin-
gencies. Thus, they inevitably leave "gaps" in their con-
tracts.171 This contractual silence is, in the absence of an arbi-
tration agreement, filled by a court's application of a
government-created default rule.172  With an arbitration
agreement, the silence is filled by whatever the parties choose.
This freedom opens up infinite possibilities.
One possibility is to fill gaps with the arbitrator's discre-
tion.173 There is a long tradition of arbitrators deciding on the
170. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
171. See Barnett, supra note 8, at 822 ("Because [parties drafting a con-
tract] cannot foresee every future event or know precisely how their own pur-
poses may change, they cannot negotiate terms specifically to cover all contin-
gencies.").
172. See id. at 823-26.
173. See Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59, 81 n.78 (1994) ("conceiv[ing] of ADR as a way of fill-
ing contractual gaps ex post"); MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note 12, at
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basis of their own sense of justice, rather than any set of
rules.1 74 Courts cannot do this without undermining the Rule
of Law, i.e., a system of "rules which make it possible to foresee
with fair certainty how the [government] authority will use its
coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one's indi-
vidual affairs on the basis of this knowledge."1" In contrast,
planning one's affairs based on predictions about how (other
people's) arbitrators will rule is not necessary because the arbi-
trator's ruling only governs the parties to that particular dis-
pute. And the parties have contracted for an unpredictable
ruling so they are in no position to complain about it. Those
who have not contracted into this unpredictability are not gov-
erned by it so Rule of Law concerns simply do not apply.
Arbitrator discretion is not the only possible replacement
for government-created default rules. The other possibilities
are private rules. These rules can be very general, e.g., the
unwritten "norms and customs of the widget industry."176 Or
they can be very specific, e.g., the "written rules and by-laws of
the Widget Dealers Association."17 7 Either sort of rules, gen-
637-38 ("[Wlhere the parties have bargained for dispute resolution through
arbitration, the method they have chosen to fill any gaps in the agreement is
the arbitrator's interpretation.").
174. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
175. FRIEDRIcH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944); see also LON
L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-39 (rev. ed. 1969) ("[Ihe attempt to
create and maintain a system of legal rules may miscarry in at least eight
ways .... The first and most obvious lies in a failure to achieve rules at all, so
that every issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis.").
176. See, e.g., Executive Life Ins. Co. v. Alexander Ins. Ltd., 999 F.2d 318,
319 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (noting that the arbitration agreement pro-
vided that the arbitrators "shall be free to reach their decision from the
standpoint of equity and customary practices of the insurance and reinsur-
ance industry rather than from that [of] strict law").
177. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Re-
thinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1765, 1771-73 (1996) (noting that National Grade and Feed Association arbi-
trators apply four sets of substantive trade rules). Bernstein cites the fol-
lowing associations that have codified their norms into written trade rules:
American Cotton Shippers Association, American Fats and Oils Association,
American Peanut Shellers Association, American Seed Trade Association,
American Spice Trade Association, American Tin Trade Association, Associa-
tion of Food Industries, Binding Industries of America, Burlap and Jute Asso-
ciation, Cocoa Merchants' Association of America, Colorado Grain and Feed
Association, Diamond Dealers Club, General Arbitration Council of the Textile
and Apparel Industries (Worth Street Rules), Green Coffee Association of
New Orleans, Green Coffee Association of New York, Kansas City Board of
Trade, Memphis Cotton Exchange, Merchants Exchange of Portland,
Mid-America Commodity Exchange, National Cottonseed Products Associa-
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eral or specific, could be incorporated into a contract without
an arbitration clause, and a court would probably try to apply
them. But parties may expect that an arbitrator who works in
the widget business will apply them better than a judge orjury. The parties may even expect that an arbitrator ignorant
of the widget business will apply them better than a judge orjury because the arbitrator is likely to exhibit better or more
intelligence, judgment, diligence, etc. In short, rules incorpo-
rated by reference into an arbitration agreement may, because
of the adjudicator, produce different law than the same rules
incorporated into a contract without an arbitration clause.178
Not only can agreements require arbitrators to apply rules,
agreements can require arbitrators to write reasoned opin-
ions. 179 As the Widget Dealers Association arbitrators build a
supply of precedents, they can be contractually required to fol-
low precedents in future cases. 80 So the privately-created law
consists of not only unwritten norms and/or written rules, but
tion, National Hay Association, National Institute of Oilseed Products, North
American Wholesale Lumber Association, Pacific Coast Coffee Association,
Pacific Northwest Grain and Feed Association, Pennsylvania Rice Millers' As-
sociation, Rubber Trade Association, Specialty Coffee Association of America,
Tea Association of the USA, Texas Cotton Association, and the Texas Grain
and Feed Association. See id. at 1805 n.134.
17M See Ribstein, supra note 112, at 251-52 (suggesting reasons why par-
ties may prefer government default rules to private ones).
179. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 177, at 1771-73; see also Bernstein,
supra note 12, at 150-51.
180. Alan Rau points out the following:[reasoned arbitrator] opinions may be especially valuable to dispu-
tants who are parties to a continuing relationship, where arbitration
can fill gaps in open-ended arrangements and send signals that help
the parties adjust their behavior in future interactions. Opinions
may equally be useful for parties to standardized transactions that
may be expected to give rise to a number of similar and of-
ten-recurring disputes, and where reasoned opinions may play a role
in developing a general consensus on industry standards. So it wouldbe natural to find that a practice of giving reasoned awards has de-
veloped in collective bargaining cases as well as in a wide range of
trade association arbitrations. In such cases it is likely, too, that rea-
soned opinions will be increasingly relied on both by disputants andby subsequent arbitrators-so that despite a general understanding
that stare decisis does not operate here, a sort of "common law" may
emerge. But outside of these areas, the continuing and inevitable
question is why contracting parties would at all choose ex ante to bear
the costs of reasoned opinions-merely in order to convey such exter-
nal benefits on third party free riders.
Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 485, 536-37(1997) (footnotes omitted); see also Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 248-49.
On the virtues of reasoned opinions, see Hayford, supra note 94.
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also decisional law. In short, arbitration can produce a sophis-
ticated, comprehensive legal system.
Even better, it can produce many such systems. The law-
unwritten norms, written rules and decisional law-of the
Widget Dealers Association may differ from the law of the
Gadget Dealers Association. Both may differ from the laws of
the Sierra Club, the Alabama Baptist Convention, the Ameri-
can Association of Retired People, the Rotary Club, or the Saab
Owners Association. Thus emerges privatized law in the full-
est sense. There is diversity because what is best for some is
not best for others.181 But there is also a process of experimen-
tation in which lawmakers learn from each other and copy laws
which seem better.182 There may even be open competition
among different lawmakers to earn money by producing better
laws.183 A market for law develops. This privatized system
produces better law than does a system in which government
monopolizes lawmaking. The principles animating privatiza-
tion around the world apply to lawmaking just as they apply to
coal mining or mail delivery. 184
2. A Note on Contract Theory
The fact that arbitration creates a market in default rules
seems to have gone underappreciated, indeed barely acknowl-
edged, in the debate over consent theories of contract even
though that debate includes scholars as thoughtful as Jules
181. See, e.g., Gary Spitko, Gone but Not Conforming: Protecting the Ab-
horrent Testator from Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-
Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1998) (positing that cultural
minorities can use arbitration to avoid the majoritarian bias of the court sys-
tem).
182. Such copying will be more likely to the extent different lawmakers
make their substantive law publicly available. It is possible that the Widget
Dealers Association, for example, tries to keep its law secret from all those
who do not incorporate it into their contracts. The amount of copying will also
depend on the extent to which market pressures lead toward standardization,
or convergence in the laws of various groups. The tradeoffs between stan-
dardization and individual tailoring apply here as they apply to contract
terms generally.
183. Cf. Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1987) ("Competition and the values underly-
ing competition should play a major role in shaping future dispute resolution
mechanisms.... Competition produces shifts towards efficiency and creates a
healthy environment in which rival dispensers of dispute resolution seek to
satisfy perceived demands.").
184. Applying these principles to law enforcement, as opposed to lawmak-
ing, is more complicated. See supra note 4.
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Coleman and Randy Barnett.18 5 Critics of consent theories,
who often refer to default rules as "gap-fillers" or "implied-in-
law" contract terms, contend that such rules are "imposed by
the legal system for reasons of principle or policy rather than
consented to by the parties."186 Barnett replies that consent to
be legally bound is "a necessary element of a prima facie con-
tractual obligation,"' 87 and is, in most circumstances, best in-
terpreted to include consent to the default rules of whatever
court has jurisdiction of the dispute.188 To which Coleman
says:
[Tihe parties could be said to consent to a relevant authority's default
rule only if they willingly, that is, noncoercively, choose it. This is not
typically the case, however. The default rules of any jurisdiction are
generally a nonnegotiable part of their bargain. Though the parties
can often contract around them, they cannot substitute the default
provisions of other jurisdictions. For that reason, it is questionable
whether by consenting to a framework of contractual rights and re-
sponsibilities the parties consent to the application of operative de-
fault provisions.
In order for the claim that merely by entering into a contract,
parties consent to the relevant default rule to be minimally plausible,
we would have to assume something like a competitive market in
authoritative jurisdictions. Then the parties would choose jurisdic-
tions based, among other things, on the default rules in effect. 89
Barnett concedes that "this argument has some merit" because
"consumers of legal systems are denied free choice among legal
jurisdictions.190
185. See infra notes 186-92 and accompanying text.
186. Barnett, supra note 8, at 822-23 (summarizing "prevailing wisdom" of
contract theory).
187. Id. at 864.
188. Id. at 864-67. Steven Burton "dofes] not think the full range of de-
fault rules can be legitimated by the parties' consent, however. To support
the contract's legitimate authority, consent must be voluntary, knowing, and
deliberate." Steven J. Burton, Default Principles, Legitimacy, and the Author-
ity of a Contract, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 115, 154 (1993). This raises time-
less philosophical issues about the circumstances that deprive consent of its
moral and legal significance. I have argued that to retain its significance,
consent must be voluntary, see Ware, supra note 19, at 103-08, 138-41, but
that it does not have to be knowing or deliberate. See Ware, supra note 9, at
200-05. The great virtue of the objective theory of contract is that it disre-
gards claims about subjective knowledge and deliberation. See id. at 204-05.
189. JULES COLEMAN, RIsKs AND WRONGs 171-72 (1992).
190. Randy E. Barnett, Rational Bargaining Theory and Contract: Default
Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud, 15 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POLY 783, 792 (1992).
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Arbitration, however, facilitates a market in competitive
jurisdictions. This is now a fairly vigorous market, as evi-
denced by the variety of arbitration systems, 191 and current ar-
bitration law facilitates further expansion of this market. Gov-
ernment default rules are not the only choice; parties can, to
use Coleman's words, "substitute the default provisions of
other jurisdictions."192
Lisa Bernstein is apparently the only scholar to inject this
point into the debate over consent theories of contract. She
suggests that "a more horizontal system of competing default
regimes is being facilitated by the rapid growth in the use of
[arbitration]."193 In response to Bernstein, Barnett says only
that arbitration is "a step in [the] direction" of "freely compet-
ing legal systems."194 This is somewhat cryptic: what makes it
only a "step in the direction"? I suggest two answers, that is,
two problems with the market in lawmaking under current ar-
bitration law. First, even if there is a competitive market for
default rules, there certainly is not one for mandatory rules.
Government monopolizes the production of mandatory law.195
191. See supra note 177; see also Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbi-
tration with a Contract Model of Arbitration 16-24 (1998) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the Minnesota Law Review).
192. COLEMAN, supra note 189, at 172.
193. Bernstein, supra note 173, at 84. Bernstein uses the term "ADR,"
rather than "arbitration," in this passage. But earlier in the same article, she
refers to "binding private ADR" as the ADR with "important implications
for... the default rules debate." Id. at 81. These qualifiers, "binding" and
"private," are crucial. Non-binding methods of ADR, such as negotiation and
mediation, resolve disputes contractually, but the contracts are formed post-
dispute so they do not implicate the distinction between mandatory and de-
fault rules. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text. Even rights
arising out of mandatory rules are alienable, post-dispute. See id. Of course,
ADR must be private, as opposed to court-annexed, see supra note 16, to fa-
cilitate anything like a competitive market in authoritative jurisdictions. So
it is not ADR facilitating such a market, but binding, private ADR. The para-
digmatic form of binding, private ADR, perhaps the only form of it, is arbitra-
tion. Arbitration, rather than ADR, is facilitating the market in default rules.
194. Randy E. Barnett,... And Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 421, 431-32 (1993). Barnett, like Bernstein, refers to "alternative dispute
resolution" rather than "arbitration." See supra note 193 for the significance
of this distinction.
195. There is some competition among various governments. The benefits
of competition among governments seem most thoroughly acknowledged with
respect to corporate shopping for law under which to incorporate. See gener-
ally Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 113, at 12; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federal-
ism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corpo-
rate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1442-43 (1992); Roberta Romano, Law As a
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Second, the market for default rules is not a level playing field
because government default rules are the default default rules.
That is, unless parties opt in to some other set of default rules,
government default rules will apply. Acknowledging that these
two problems exist, we can ask whether they are inevitable. Is
there any way to avoid the monopolization of mandatory law or
a default provider of default rules? 96
Barnett suggests that "[ilf meaningful competition among
legal systems existed... a general consent to be legally
bound... might be construed as including a genuine consent
even to those immutable [mandatory] rules that one cannot
contract around." 97 But such rules are ultimately default rules
if one becomes bound by them only by contracting into a legal
system as a whole. It seems, then, that mandatory rules can
only be produced by government. And it is logically impossible
for law to consist only of default rules because the concept of a
default rule presupposes rules specifying the requirements for
forming an enforceable contract. 198 The only way parties could
"contract around" the "law on contracting around" would be to
form a contract specifying the requirements for forming later
contracts among them. The original contract though, would
have to be governed by mandatory rules on the formation of en-
forceable contracts. The mandatory rules specifying the re-
quirements for forming an enforceable contract differ from
other mandatory rules in that the former must, as a matter of
logic, be mandatory.199
C. THE BOUNDARIEs OF PRiVATELY-CREATED LAW
The foregoing note on contract theory serves to remind us
that "privatized" lawmaking, as used in this Article, means
privately-created law enforced by government. To that extent,
government undergirds this "privatized" law. But this should
not obscure the vast amount of privatization permitted by cur-
Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225
(1985).
196. This may be another way of asking whether law can exist without
government. For impressive answers, see BARNETT, supra note 4, and
BENSON, supra note 4.
197. Barnett, supra note 8, at 905.
198. "[B]efore implementing any default standard, courts need to establish,
as a logically prior matter, rules for deciding ... what is sufficient to contract
around a default." Ayres & Gertner, supra note 8, at 119-20.
199. This point has implications for arbitration law's separability doctrine,
discussed infra note 203.
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rent arbitration law.200 As Part H showed, privatized law-
making can currently extend to otherwise mandatory rules, as
well as to default rules, because, under current Supreme Court
cases, virtually all claims are arbitrable and courts do not en-
sure that government law is applied to those claims. 201 An ar-
bitration agreement contracts out of all the law that would
have been applied by a court but for the agreement. All such
law, in effect, consists of default rules because arbitration
agreements are enforced.202 All such law is privatizable. The
first section of Part I argued that, to preserve mandatory law,
this must change. Either claims arising out of mandatory rules
should become inarbitrable or they should be subject to de novo
judicial review.
Even if this were to occur, there would still be wide oppor-
tunities for privatization. Privatized lawmaking would still ex-
tend to default rules. There would be universal arbitrability of
claims arising out of default rules and courts would enforce ar-
bitrators' rulings on such claims regardless of whether the ar-
bitrators applied government law. While this laissez-faire ar-
bitration would be confined to claims arising under default
rules, it would not be confined to contract claims.203 There are
numerous default rules outside of contract law,20 4 and claims in
those areas would remain arbitrable.
200. Government enforcement of a private judge's decision "no more com-
promises the private nature of the adjudication system... than the law of
trespass compromises the private property rights system." Landes & Posner,
supra note 12, at 237.
20L See supra Part H.
202 See supra Part 11.
203. Nor would it encompass all contract claims. Contract law itself has
many mandatory rules, see Slawson, supra note 9, at 32, and parties should
not be able to avoid these by agreeing to arbitrate. In an earlier article I criti-
cize arbitration law's separability doctrine on the ground that it permits par-
ties to avoid mandatory law regarding the formation of enforceable contracts.
See Ware, supra note 19, at 128-38 & n.270. As Alan Rau puts it, "tjhere is
simply no agreement to anything, for example, where a signature has been
forged, or where an authentic signature was obtained at gunpoint." Alan Rau,
The New York Convention in American Courts, 7 AM. REV. INTIL ARB. 213, 253
n.173 (1996). This can be read as saying that the contract formation require-
ment of manifestations of assent and the contract defense of duress are both
mandatory rules, rules which cannot be contracted around. In contrast, the
misrepresentation defense may be a default rule, at least in certain types of
transactions. Cf, e.g., the majority and dissenting opinions in Danann Realty
Corp. v. Harris, 184 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1959).
204. See, e.g., Slawson, supra note 9, at 30 ("[Most of the common law con-
sists of rules that could be preempted by a contract.").
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For example, automobile insurance companies could have
an enormous impact on negligence law if all their insurance
policies had arbitration clauses making all the company's other
policyholders third-party beneficiaries.205 Then an auto acci-
dent involving, for instance, two Allstate customers would go to
arbitration, not litigation. If all the insurers contracted with
each other, they could extend this arbitration system to acci-
dents involving customers of different insurers. The negligence
law of auto accidents could be taken away from judges and ju-
ries and produced, instead, by arbitrators. 206 Nor would the
arbitration clause in auto insurance policies have to be limited
to auto disputes. If the clause was written broadly enough to
cover a land dispute between neighbors or a testamentary dis-
pute between devisees, the law in those areas would be pri-
vately-created, too. Nor would insurers have to be the only hub
of hub-and-spoke arbitration agreements. A magazine could be
a hub with spokes connecting all its subscribers. Mastercard
could be a hub with spokes connecting all its cardholders.
Other hubs might be created for the sole purpose of dispute
resolution.
William Landes and Richard Posner point out that in pre-
dispute arbitration agreements "the parties agree.., on thejudge (or on the method of selecting him) before the dispute
arises."207 They add that this is possible "only where the dis-
pute arises from a preexisting voluntary relationship between
the parties; the typical tort or crime does not."208 This may be
unduly narrow. As the auto accident example indicates, many
torts involve disputes between people who, although they have
not contracted with each other, are contractually-linked
through intermediaries.209 If arbitration clauses appeared in
the contracts of a few major hubs-such as the utilities pro-
viding water, electricity or phone service-nearly every Ameri-
can might well agree to arbitrate any dispute with anyone.
205. With this scenario, compare BARNETT, supra note 4, at 284-97, with
Carbonneau, supra note 44, at 20-22.
206. Negligence law consists largely of default rules. See FARNSWORTH,
supra note 21, § 5.2, at 353 ("[A] party generally can exempt itself from liabil-
ity or limit its liability in tort for harm caused by negligence, as long as the
provision is not unconscionable.").
207. Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 237.
208. Id.
209. Landes and Posner acknowledge this "when both parties to the dis-
pute are members of the same (private) group or association." Id. at 238. I
am merely explaining how such groups could encompass more people.
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Some may feel that this vision goes too far.210 Creating
law, the argument goes, is a difficult, complex process, requir-
ing education in the law and sensitivity to the interests of vari-
ous groups in society. In general, judges, elected officials and
their appointees are better suited to lawmaking than are pri-
vate parties. The expertise of private parties and their arbitra-
tors is confined to the ways of their particular business or ac-
tivity. So arbitrators ought to stick to factual questions, not
venture into legal ones.211
This may be the conclusion everyone reaches. If so, no
harm arises in allowing private law to be created through arbi-
tration because people will choose to leave lawmaking in gov-
ernment hands.212 But the problem with mandatory rules is
that they do not permit lawmaking in private hands. When
government lawmakers enact mandatory rules and prevent
privatization of law, they look like postal workers excluding
private firms from the delivery of first-class mail.213 That is,
they look like people opposing privatization, not because of con-
fidence that nobody will switch to private alternatives, but be-
cause of fear that many will.
210. Cf. William J. Woodward, Jr., "Sale" of Law and Forum and the Wid-
ening Gulf Between "Consumer" and "Nonconsumer" Contracts in the UCC, 75
WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 257 n.59 (1997) ("The very idea that people do-or
should-go shopping for law and forum has a surreal character to it. The vi-
sion that comes to my mind is our consumer (or, perhaps, CEO or her lawyer)
with a shopping cart ambling down one aisle with products liability 'products,'
another with disclaimer 'products,' and perhaps a third with unconscionability
'Products.').
211. As the Supreme Court said in the context of labor arbitration:
[Tihe specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the
law of the shop, not the law of the land. Parties usually choose an
arbitrator because they trust his knowledge and judgment concerning
the demands and norms of industrial relations. On the other hand,
the resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary re-
sponsibility of courts ....
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974) (citations omitted).
212. Some will worry that those with "economic power" will use "adhesion
contracts" to "impose" private law on consumers, employees, etc. These con-
cerns are now addressed by the application of various contract law doctrines
to arbitration agreements. Such doctrines include those relating to the forma-
tion and interpretation of contracts and defenses to their enforcement. See
Ware, supra note 9, passim (arguing that contract law doctrines are the best
way to address these concerns).
213. See generally George L. Priest, The History of the Postal Monopoly in
the United States, 18 J.L. & ECON. 33 (1975). There is "little evidence to sup-
port [the] claim of natural monopoly conditions in the postal industry." Id. at
76.
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CONCLUSION
Arbitration privatizes the creation of law. Judicial en-
forcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements, in effect, con-
verts what would otherwise be mandatory law into default law.
To prevent this, the Supreme Court must either (1) reverse its
decisions that claims arising under otherwise mandatory rules
are arbitrable, or (2) require de novo judicial review of arbitra-
tors' legal rulings on such claims. The first option seems to be
in less tension with the FAA and subject to less troubling prac-
tical problems.
Law consisting of default rules should remain arbitrable
and subject to zero judicial review. Any alternative would con-
travene freedom of contract, and the FAA's endorsement of it,
without a solid ground for doing so. The arbitration of claims
arising under default rules presents an opportunity to privat-
ize the creation of vast areas of law. It is an opportunity to
create private legal systems of unwritten norms, written rules,
and the precedents of private courts. Parties have only begun
to seize this opportunity.
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